Brand Partnerships and the Determinants for Success by Newmeyer, Casey Espey
 Brand Partnerships and the Determinants for Success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Casey Espey Newmeyer 
B.A. Physics and Astronomy, University of Pittsburgh, 2003 
M.B.A, Rollins College: Crummer Graduate School of Business, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Katz Graduate School of Business in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2011 
 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
Katz Graduate School of Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Casey E. Newmeyer 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
June 3, 2011 
and approved by 
R. Venkatesh, Professor, Marketing 
Rabikar Chatterjee, Professor and Faculty Fellow, Marketing 
Vanitha Swaminathan, Associate Professor and Robert W. Murphy Faculty Fellow, Marketing 
Julie Ruth, Associate Professor of Marketing, Rutgers School of Business; Camden 
 Dissertation Advisor: John Hulland, Professor and Dean’s Excellence Faculty Fellow, 
Marketing 
 
 
 iii 
Copyright © by Casey E. Newmeyer 
2011 
 
 iv 
 
Abstract 
Brand partnerships are increasingly common as the cost of developing new products and brands 
is expensive in terms of both monetary outcomes and potential negative spillover effects to 
existing brand and products in a firm’s portfolio.  This dissertation explores how the risk 
associated with such brand partnerships can be reduced.  In the following three essays brand 
partnerships in the form of brand acquisitions and co-brand arrangements are explored.  Essay 1 
focuses on brands joining together through brand acquisitions and the impact on firm value in 
terms of cumulative abnormal stock returns is used as the outcome variable of interest.  In both 
Essay 2 and 3 co-brand arrangements are explored and the impact on consumer recall and 
evaluation is the outcome of interest.  In all cases, managerial insights are provided to help 
improve the decision making process of forming such a partnership.     
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Pairing brands together has become a common practice among firms.  One cannot grocery shop 
(i.e., Giant Eagle with Starbucks; Breyer’s Ice Cream with Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup), take a 
commercial flight (i.e., United Airlines partnership with XM Satellite Radio), or go to a sporting 
event (i.e., Heinz field hosts the Pittsburgh Steelers) without being inundated with co-brands and 
strategic alliances.  Such brand partnerships span a spectrum from being completely fused 
together in form and function like component branding (Intel microprocessor inside a Dell 
computer) or entirely self-standing such as in co-promotion (American Airlines and Hertz). 
These partnerships can develop in numerous ways including: a firm bringing two or more of its 
own brands together (Procter and Gamble has combined Febreze with Tide); two or more firms 
bringing brands together (Eddie Bauer and Ford); or when a firm purchases another brand 
(FedEx and Kinkos).   
 While research has looked at various reasons to form such brand partnerships (e.g., Rao, 
Qu and Ruekert 1999; Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986) and has separately explored different 
types of partnerships such as ingredient branding (e.g., Desai and Keller 2002), co-location (e.g., 
Iyer and Pazgal 2003), and brand acquisitions (e.g.; Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 2006) very little research 
has explored what characteristics a firm should look for when choosing a partner based on the 
specific type of partnership created. One overarching goal of this dissertation is to explore what 
characteristics of a brand and its partner help facilitate a successful relationship depending on the 
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type of relationship formed.  For example, in Essay 1, I find that in the absence of a brand 
management system, a high level of fit between the target brand and the acquiring firm’s 
products produces larger cumulative abnormal returns than if fit was low.  In Essay 2 and Essay 
3, I explore how hedonic similarity and functional complementarity between the partnering 
brands in a co-brand increase brand recall and evaluation; however, the impact of these 
constructs is more important for very highly integrated partnerships such as ingredient branding 
versus lesser integrated types such as co-promotion.   
Essay 1.  Mergers and acquisitions involving multiple brand names are one type of 
situation when the characteristics of partnering brands play an important role in the success of 
the partnership.  For example, why was the purchase of Vitamin Water by Coca-Cola in 2007 for 
$4.1 billion a resounding success, and the purchase of Snapple in 1994 by Quaker Oats for $1.6 
billion such a horrible failure. Exploring this issue is important as such transfers of brands and 
other resources from one firm to another are commonly used as a strategic option for firms that 
are seeking to expand (e.g., Porter 1987).     
The first essay of my dissertation, “When Brands Trade Hands:  Factors Influencing 
Value Creation Following Brand Acquisition Announcements” explores the brand and firm 
characteristics for both the target and acquirer which facilitate the successful purchase of another 
brand.  In this paper, I investigate the role of brand acquisitions in influencing the value of the 
acquirer from the perspective of the financial markets.  Using the resource-based view of the 
firm, I argue that the value creation effect of brand acquisition announcements is a function of 
the target brand strength, the brand strategy used by the acquiring firm, the fit between acquirer 
and target brand, the acquirer’s degree of diversification, and the presence of a brand 
management system.   
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Using a sample of brand acquisitions, the model is tested via an event study approach.  
Overall, brand acquisitions provide significant positive cumulative abnormal returns to the 
acquiring brand while acquisitions in the same industries for reasons such as products, research 
and development or distribution do not.    The cumulative returns for the brand acquisitions are 
then used in a regression analysis and the results show a significant positive effect for brand 
strength.  When the target brand is strong, abnormal returns are larger.  Also, two significant 
three-way interactions are explored.  The first is between the presence of a brand management 
system, fit between the target and acquiring brands, and brand strategy.  When a brand 
management system is absent, the fit between the acquiring firm and target firm is more 
important for an acquiring firm with a corporate brand strategy than a house of brands strategy.  
The second interaction between the presence of a brand management system, fit, and 
diversification shows that in the absence of a brand management system, fit is extremely 
important when the acquiring firm has a low level of diversification.  
Essay 2 and 3.  The second and third essays of my dissertation focus on co-branding; or 
the strategy of intentionally pairing existing brands together and presenting them to consumers 
(Kotler and Keller 2009).  Many of the papers in this research stream fail to provide managerial 
guidelines that address how and with whom a firm should partner over various partnership types.  
For example, Park, Jun and Shocker (1996) find that when partnering brands have 
complementary attributes the joint product is better perceived by consumers; yet this research 
only looks at highly integrated partnerships such as ingredient branding.  Would this result hold 
for a lower level of integration such as co-promotion?   I attempt to address this gap in the 
literature in Essay 2 and 3 of my dissertation by linking the level of partnership integration with 
multiple outcome variables.    
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 Completely conceptual, Essay 2, “Co-Branding Arrangements and Partner Selection: A 
Conceptual Framework and Managerial Guidelines” presents a typology of co-branding formed 
from insights gained from personal interviews with managers, real world examples and current 
academic literature.  This typology, summarized below, ranks the levels of co-branding from 
most to least integrated.   
• Co-Development: the highest level of co-branding where firms pool their resources to co-
create the product which is completely blended in form and function and it is practically 
impossible to separate the two brands.  
 
• Ingredient Branding: the second highest level (e.g., Desai and Keller 2002).  In this scenario 
two products are developed separately and then combine into one product.  In this situation, 
as in Diet Coke with Splenda, the consumer cannot separate the brands.   
 
• Component branding: the third highest level, is similar to ingredient branding; however, the 
consumer can separate the individual brands (Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997).    
 
• Brand Bundling: moving further own the typology, brand bundling is a form of co-branding 
that positions two functionally compatible, yet separate brands together which are sold as a 
package (e.g., Stremersch and Tellis 2002). 
 
• Co-Promotion: the second lowest level occurs when two brands have standalone value, but 
participate in an incentive program for joint purchase (e.g., Varadarajan and Rajaratnam); 
however the consumer is not required to buy both products. 
 
• Co-Location: the final, and lowest level of co-branding integration (e.g., Iyer and Pazgal 
2003) occurs when two brands are self-standing. Purchasing both may provide more variety 
or reduce search costs, but there is no monetary incentive to buy both brands.  
 
A series of propositions is then developed which utilize both the mechanisms of 
attribution and categorization to understand the implications of co-branding integration, in terms 
of the impact on brand evaluation and brand accessibility.  Further, I consider the moderating 
effects of hedonic congruence and functional complementarity among the partners, as well as the 
partnering brand’s breadth, on the outcome of the co-branding arrangement. The propositions 
provide normative guidance on which co-branding arrangements a firm should pursue, and what 
attributes the co-brand partner should possess, in order to enhance evaluation or accessibility of 
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its brand.  The Managerial Implications section examines how the outcomes of evaluation and 
accessibility map onto brand and market development goals.  Directions for future research are 
also discussed.   
Essay 3, “Co-branding Integration and the Impact on Brand Evaluation and Recall” sets 
out to experimentally test many of the propositions outlined in Essay 2.  Depending on the level 
of integration between co-brand partners, the importance of different partner characteristics will 
gain or lose importance.  As the level of integration increases, the brands become more 
dependent on each another and the cause of positive and negative attributes of the jointly 
branded product are harder to untangle; making the impact on brand evaluation stronger.  Also, 
because the brands are more closely related, the associations in memory should be stronger and 
recall will increase.  Two experiments were conducted which show promising results.  While the 
main effect of integration on recall was not significant there were significant results for the 
impact on integration on evaluation.  The essay concludes with directions for moving forward 
with additional studies to continue this line of research.   
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows:  Essay 1, 2, and 3 are presented next 
in separate chapters.  A final conclusion is then presented, which discusses the overall 
implications for this work and directions for moving forward. 
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2.0  ESSAY 1: WHEN BRANDS CHANGE HANDS: FACTORS INFLUENCING 
VALUE CREATION FOLLOWING BRAND ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS 
General Mills acquired Pillsbury for $ 10.5 billion in 2000. Coca-Cola acquired Glaceau, 
producer of Vitamin Water, for $ 4.1 billion in 2007. These are two instances of acquisitions 
undertaken specifically to acquire one or more brands. Such transfers of brands and other 
resources from one firm to another are increasingly used as a strategic option by firms seeking to 
expand (e.g., Dyer, Kale and Singh 2004; Makri, Hitt and Lane 2010; Hitt, Hoskisson and 
Ireland 2001).  But do they add shareholder value?   
Although brand acquisitions are an important strategic tool in marketing, there is limited 
research as to the impact of brand acquisitions on the financial value of an acquirer.  Previous 
work has shown the impact of brand acquisitions on the value of the target brand (Bahadir et.al. 
2008), but little work has explored how the acquiring firm is affected.  There are two exceptions 
to this.  The first is a working paper by Wiles, Morgan and Rego (2011) which identifies several 
variables leading to abnormal returns for firms acquiring brands.  Abnormal returns increase for 
buyers that have strong marketing capabilities and buyers that have identified cost synergies with 
the acquired brand.  Additionally, higher returns are shown when a brand with a high quality 
position is purchased. Our work takes a more detailed approach of exploring what marketing 
factors lead brand acquisitions to be successful such as a brand management capability and the 
brand name strategy of the acquiring firm.  The second paper by Mizik, Knowles and Dinner 
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(2011) explores how changes to the brand names of the target and acquiring firms effect market 
reactions.  For example, firms that combine brand names such as FedEx Kinkos show a better 
return than those that subsume the target firm’s brand name or keep the target firm’s brand name 
as a separate entity as P&G did with Gillette.  Our work differs from this in that we explore how 
the branding strategy and capabilities of the acquiring firm (not the firm’s actual brand) impacts 
market returns when a brand is purchased.  Taking the perspective of the acquiring firm is 
important as the ultimate financial success or failure of the transaction is measured by the market 
reaction and change in stock price of the acquiring firm.     
 The broader literature on mergers and acquisitions has examined the impact of 
acquisitions on acquirer and target value. The results are mixed in this regard.  Most previous 
work in the context of mergers has shown that many acquisitions do not create value for the 
acquirers (e.g., Dyer, Kale, and Singh 2004, Marks and Mirvis 2001). However, other studies 
have found that mergers and acquisitions can be a major source of firm value under specific 
circumstances (Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988; Hitt et al. 2009; King, Slotegraaf and Kesner 
2008; Makri et al. 2010; Jensen and Ruback 1983; Malatesta 1983; Seth 1990).  For example, 
King et al (2004) argue that some types of acquisitions lead to more positive returns than others, 
and specific characteristics of acquisitions can influence whether value creation occurs1; 
however many of these have yet to be discovered.  In this work we will show that while many 
acquisitions within the industries of Health and Beauty, Pharmaceuticals, and Food and Beverage 
do not lead to positive results, those acquisitions described as “brand acquisitions” lead to 
positive abnormal returns.    
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, the term “value” or “value creation” is in reference to the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) accrued after the acquisition.  CAR result from the positive (or negative) perception of the transaction in the 
marketplace. .   
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The brand acquisitions are then explored further using research on mergers identifying 
various factors that may contribute to acquirer value. For instance, one factor that has received a 
lot of attention in the literature is fit between target and acquirer. Despite its acknowledged 
importance, a review of the literature suggests that there is a lack of consensus as to when such 
target-acquirer fit plays a role in creating value for the acquiring firm (Kim 2004). Whereas some 
research demonstrates the importance of fit between merging firms (e.g., Shelton 1988; Datta et 
al. 1992; Singh and Montgomery 1987), other research suggests that differences or lack of fit 
across merging entities or complementarity is more valuable (Harrison et al. 1991; King et al. 
2008; Larsson and Finkelstein 1999; Makri et al. 2010).  Reconciling these divergent findings, 
Swaminathan, Murshed and Hulland (2008) suggest that the impact of fit (or relatedness) may 
depend upon the objectives of the merger.   
Building on this cornerstone idea that target-acquirer fit critically affects subsequent 
acquirer value, we identify three factors that can interact with fit to attenuate or strengthen its 
impact on firm value in the acquisition context: (1) acquirer brand name strategy; (2) extent of 
acquirer diversification; and (3) acquirer brand management capability. First, we suggest that 
investors are more likely to be concerned about lack-of-fit when the acquirer has a house-of-
brands strategy (i.e., multiple distinct brands are supported) compared to a corporate brand 
strategy (i.e., all products are sold under the same brand).  An acquired brand that fits well can be 
easily rolled into an existing brand portfolio when a house of brands strategy is used.  In contrast, 
when a corporate brand strategy is employed, the target brand, whether it fits with the existing 
portfolio or not, is more likely to be eliminated or otherwise subsumed under the acquirer’s 
corporate brand, having negative implications for brand acquisition success (Jaju, Joiner and 
Reddy 2006).  
 9 
Second, the acquirer’s degree of diversification can moderate the role of fit between 
acquirer and target in value creation. When the acquirer has a narrow focus and has typically 
focused on a single industry, a brand acquisition involving an unrelated industry may raise 
concerns about the acquirer’s ability to manage unrelated acquisitions.  In contrast, a diversified 
acquirer has a proven ability to manage unrelated businesses, which may alleviate investor 
concerns about the acquirer’s ability to successfully integrate the acquired brand(s) into its 
existing brand portfolio.  
Finally, we build on work in the strategy field showing the critical role of capabilities as a 
catalyst for acquisition success (Makadok 2001). Within marketing, scholars have focused on the 
impact of acquirer marketing capabilities on merger success (e.g., Bahadir, Bharadwaj and 
Srivastava 2008; Capron and Hulland 1999).In this paper, we look more carefully at the 
acquirer’s brand management capability, and consider it as an important boundary condition for 
the above effects. We posit that this capability is a critical success factor that influences the 
success of a brand acquisition and moderates the aforementioned interactions of fit with both 
acquirer brand name strategy and acquirer diversification. 
In summary, the focus of the present research is on developing and testing a framework 
of value creation (as perceived by the market place) following brand acquisition. We focus on 
brand-intensive industries such as packaged goods, pharmaceutical, and healthcare. Further, we 
identify target brand strength, fit between target and acquirer, brand name strategy of the 
acquirer, the acquirer’s degree of diversification, and the acquirer’s brand management 
capability as factors that influence the acquirer’s value. We go beyond the main effects of these 
factors and examine their interactions, thereby extending recent research that has sought to 
examine mergers and acquisitions from a marketing perspective (e.g., Bahadir, Bharadwaj and 
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Srivastava 2008; Capron and Hulland 1999; Homburg and Bucerius 2005; Jaju, Joiner and 
Reddy 2006; Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis 2005). For example, the brand name strategy of the 
acquiring firm plays an important role in the reaction of the market; however, it does not play a 
role when there is a strong brand management capability present.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we present the results 
of our event study.  We then explore the theoretical background for the key issues outlined and 
develop the hypotheses.  The method and results are presented next.  In the final section, a 
summary and discussion outlining the limitations, implications and areas for future research of 
this work is included. 
 
2.1 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Do Brand Acquisition Announcements Lead to Abnormal Returns? 
From the perspective of the resource based view (RBV) acquisitions are a method of 
obtaining new and expanding existing assets and capabilities.  Obtaining such assets and 
capabilities can be quicker and possibly more cost effective than creating them (e.g., Haspeslagh 
and Jemison 1991).  While value may be created if synergies exist between the acquirer and 
target firms (e.g., Dyer, Kale and Singh 2004); generally, investors do not always react positively 
to an acquisition announcement, and acquisitions are not found to create shareholder value (for a 
comprehensive review see King et.al. 2004).  When investors react to new information about a 
company and the stock price change is significantly different than what would be expected 
without the information this is an abnormal return.  Abnormal returns can be either positive or 
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negative and when they are summed over a number of days this is referred to as the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR).   
Typically, research has shown that acquiring firms do not have abnormal returns when 
the target is either related or unrelated in product, market or technology areas as resources are 
often underutilized (Singh and Montgomery 1987).  While acquiring capabilities in R&D, a new 
product line, or a manufacturing facility may seem beneficial, firms show zero or a small 
insignificant negative return because the market does not expect synergies to be realized.   For 
example in the area of R&D it has been shown that internal R&D knowledge helps facilitate 
innovation by moving the appropriate project forward as well as incorporating external 
knowledge into the firm (Arora and Gambardella 1994; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002).  Also, 
when R&D is acquired instead of grown organically, the firm actually invests less in innovation 
(Hitt et.al. 1991).  Previous research makes it apparent that organic growth in these areas, while 
risky and expensive, may be more beneficial in the eyes of the financial markets compared to 
acquiring these resources (King et.al. 2004).   
It has also been shown that positive returns will accrue to a target firm but not to the 
acquiring firm (Bahadir et al. 2008). Additional research calls for more studies, similar to that of 
King and co-authors (2008), which identify particular situations when acquisitions will create 
value for shareholders (King et. al.  2004).    
One such situation where acquisitions have been shown to create value is when a brand 
name is involved in the transaction (Wiles, Morgan and Rego 2011).  More specifically the 
authors show brand acquisitions in 31 industries create value when a marketing capability is 
present in the acquiring firm, cost synergies exist, and a large brand is purchased (Wiles, Morgan 
and Rego 2011). Marketing resources are an important part of the overall resource base of a firm 
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(Day 1994; Dierickx and Cool 1989), and some marketing resources –  particularly those that are 
intangible, such as the equity associated with brands (e.g., Keller 1993) – are rare, valuable, 
imperfectly imitable, non-substitutable and immobile (Capron and Hulland 1999).The primary 
objective of a brand acquisition is to gain access to the valuable resources that a particular brand 
provides.  Brands provide name recognition, reduced switching behavior, reduced costs, and 
provide a price premium (Srivastava et. al. 1998).  These benefits provided by the brand have a 
strong positive relationship with stock price behavior (Aaker and Jacobson 2001; Barth et al. 
1998; Rego, Billet, and Morgan 2009) and will translate into favorable investor reactions to a 
brand acquisition announcement.  Confirming previous results we propose:   
H1a:   There will not be significant cumulative abnormal returns for acquisitions 
when the announcement is related to research and development, distribution 
and manufacturing, and products.  
 
H1b:   There will be significant cumulative abnormal returns for an acquisition 
when the announcement includes a brand name.  
 
 
What Factors Impact the Return of a Brand Acquisition Announcement? 
 Due to their intangible aspects, acquiring brands is not simply a matter of transferring 
resources from one firm to another (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Rather, a number of 
conditions must be present in order to ensure the successful transition from a target to an 
acquiring firm.  Specifically, we argue that target brand strength, acquirer brand strategy, fit 
between acquirer and target industries, acquirer brand management capability and acquirer 
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diversification interact with each other to create value following a brand acquisition. A summary 
of the proposed framework is provided in Figure 1. We outline our arguments for various 
components of the conceptual framework and provide hypotheses below. 
 
 
Brand Strength (H2) 
Focal Main Effect 
Fit * Acquirer Brand Management Capability* 
Acquirer Brand Name Strategy (H3) 
 
Fit * Acquirer Brand Management Capability * 
Acquirer Diversification (H4) 
 
 
Focal Interaction Effects 
Fit 
Acquirer Brand Management Capability 
Acquirer Brand Name Strategy 
Acquirer Diversification 
 
Other Relevant Variables 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns 
Industry Size Ratio  
Acquirer’s Age 
Target Industry Growth Rate 
Acquirer’s Sales and Advertising Expenditures 
Acquirer’s Operating Margin 
 
Control Variables 
 FIGURE 1: Conceptual Model of Brand Acquisition Success 
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Brand Strength.  There is substantial evidence that investors reward firms with strong brands. 
Strong brands have been shown to strengthen positive reactions to brand extension 
announcements (Lane and Jacobson 1994) and contribute positively to stock returns (Aaker and 
Jacobson 2001; Barth et al. 1998);further, strong brands can also minimize the risk associated 
with stock returns (Rego, Billet and Morgan 2009). These results suggest that there is a strong, 
positive relationship between brand strength and stock market value. 
  There are various reasons why the acquisition of strong brands results in greater firm 
value.  Strong brands help signal a level of quality, encouraging loyal consumers to make repeat 
purchases (Erdem 1998). This brand loyalty can create significant barriers to entry that result in 
greater competitive advantage (Keller 1998). A well-differentiated brand can be a foundation 
from which to launch new products, improve relationships with channel partners and help to earn 
higher distribution clout in the marketplace. An acquired brand can also offer opportunities for 
co-branding and cross-selling with existing brand offerings, thereby creating valuable spillover 
effects on an acquirer’s products (Keller 1998).  Additionally, the acquired brand can appeal to 
new market segments and ensure greater market coverage (Basu 2002).  Past research has shown 
that in a hypothetical merger situation, brand equity  (or brand strength) explains a significant 
portion of the variance in the perceived value of the merger (Mahajan et al 1994), and also 
affects target brand value (Bahadir, Bharadwaj and Srivastava 2008). To the extent that investors 
are aware of these positive effects of brand strength on firm performance, we expect the 
following:       
H2:   The strength of the target brand has a positive impact on acquirer’s firm 
value following the announcement of a brand acquisition. 
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Other Independent Variables 
As indicated in Figure 1, while we anticipate a main effect of brand strength on firm 
value, the effects of the remaining independent variables are expected to interact.  Before 
discussing the two key interactions shown in this figure, we first individually introduce and 
describe these other independent variables (fit, brand management capability, brand name 
strategy, and diversification) in the sections below. 
Fit. The degree of fit between the acquired brand and the acquirer’s product portfolio has 
important implications for the success of the brand acquisition.  Research looking at the 
similarity between firms has been a focus of previous research in the mergers area (Rumelt 1974; 
Salter and Weinhold 1979; Singh and Montgomery 1987; Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 
2008) and focuses on relatedness as reflected in the transfer of functional skills between 
businesses (such as R&D, marketing, production and distribution).  Rumelt (1974) considered 
merging businesses to be related if they serve similar markets, use similar production 
technologies, or exploit similar scientific research.  Fit has been shown to lead to positive dollar 
gains (Shelton 1988) and positive cumulative abnormal returns (Singh and Montgomery 1987). 
There are three benefits that arise from relatedness: economies of scale, economies of scope and 
market power.  Economies of scale are realized when merging firms have the same products.  
Economies of scope arise when resources are shared across more than one product (e.g., brand 
names). Market power benefits arise when merging firms operate in the same industry.  
Marketing integration between the acquirer and target has also been shown to positively affect 
the value of the transaction (Homburg and Bucerius 2005).   
What this means in the brand acquisition context is that acquired brands can create more 
value when they are related to a firm’s core business than when they are not.  When acquired 
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brands “fit” with existing brands, the opportunities for shared production facilities, marketing 
activities, and knowledge may result in greater efficiencies.  Arguments regarding the 
importance of fit (or relatedness) can also be made from a consumer behavior perspective.  For 
example, using a categorization view, greater fit between brands makes it easier for consumers to 
transfer affect from one object to another (Aaker and Keller 1990). Given this, consumers’ 
reactions to ownership changes of brand names may depend on the degree of perceived fit 
between the new owners and the acquired brand names.   
Brand Management Capability. Acquiring a strong brand creates a competitive advantage for a 
firm, but a superior brand management capability is also needed to maintain this position (Day 
1994). For example, Hulland, Wade, and Antia (2007) show brand management capabilities are a 
significant driver of sales and performance in the online retailing industry. In the brand 
acquisition context, possession of a superior brand management capability will help overcome a 
firm’s natural tendency to focus on its existing brand portfolio (which it understands); 
furthermore, the lack of a superior brand management capability may result in inadequate 
attention being dedicated to the acquired brand.   
A company with a brand management structure is likely to have management of brand 
equity as a corporate goal, recognizes brands as critical assets, has integrated brand management 
into its corporate strategy, and is willing to devote considerable resources to managing brands 
(Shocker, Srivastava and Ruekert 1994). Lee et al. (2008) show that a more organized, 
developed, and efficient brand management system leads to increased brand performance.  
More important, brand management capability should be viewed in conjunction with 
other brand acquisition characteristics in order to fully understand its value creation impact. We 
describe these subsequently. 
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Brand Name Strategy. Another factor influencing brand acquisition success is the brand name 
strategy of the acquirer. The brand name strategy employed for products can range from using a 
corporate name for all products (e.g., Sony) to using individual brand names that are completely 
unrelated to the corporate name (e.g., Crest, Tide, and Oil of Olay are all brand names for 
products manufactured by Procter & Gamble).  A mixed strategy can also be used when some 
products fall under a corporate name (e.g., Johnson & Johnson) but the firm also owns products 
under individual names (e.g. J&J also owns Aveeno, Neutrogena, etc.).   
Rao et al. (2004) investigate the role of the aforementioned branding strategies (i.e., 
corporate branding versus house-of-brands) on firm value; they find  that firms using a corporate 
branding strategy in general are valued more highly (i.e., they have higher Tobin’s q values). 
Extending this to a brand acquisition context, it can be argued that when the acquired brand has a 
corporate name strategy, the acquisition of a target brand will eventually result in a name change 
for the target brand as the brand gets integrated into the umbrella brand of the acquirer company.  
For instance, when Marriott Senior Living acquired Sterling Senior Living, the naming strategy 
of the acquirer (i.e., use of the Marriott corporate name)implied that a name change had to take 
place following the acquisition. Such a name change (e.g., Sterling Senior Living changing to 
Marriott Senior Living) invariably implies an accompanying change of other key brand elements 
(e.g., logo, trademark), implying substantial target brand redeployment. 
On the other hand, when the acquiring firm uses a house of brands strategy, the 
likelihood of the acquiring firm making changes to the key brand elements associated with the 
target brand is lower.  By preserving the foundations of the target brand, the risks inherent in 
making changes to the key brand elements and damaging the equity of the brand is minimized. 
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Acquirer’s Degree of Diversification.A high degree of acquiring firm diversification is likely to 
weaken the value creating effect of brand acquisitions. The literature on the ‘diversification 
discount’ argues that firms should focus their businesses around core competencies and empirical 
findings have demonstrated that diversification can weaken firm value (e.g., Burch and Nanda 
2003; Dennis, Dennis and Yost 2002). In the marketing context, Varadarajan et al. (2001) 
suggest that firms that engage in “deconglomeration” by selling or divesting unrelated businesses 
actually gain significant advantages in terms of greater customer and competitor orientation and 
by being more innovative.  The key feature distinguishing conglomerate and deconglomerate 
firms is that the former is largely composed of unrelated businesses (i.e., highly diversified) 
rather than fewer, related businesses (i.e., low degree of diversification).  
Interaction Effects 
As noted earlier, a crucial determinant of post-acquisition success is the acquirer – target 
fit. However, past research suggests that fit in isolation explains only part of the story (e.g., Hitt 
et al. 1991; Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2007), and that its interaction with other 
constructs must also be considered.  We have already identified the acquirer’s brand 
management capabilities as a critical success factor that influences the success of a brand 
acquisition, and that moderates both the interaction of fit with acquirer brand name strategy and 
the interaction of fit with acquirer diversification. Both of these three-way interactions are 
described more fully next.  
Fit, Acquirer Brand Management Capability, and Acquirer Brand Strategy. The impact 
of fit on firm valuation is likely to vary based upon the brand name strategy of the acquiring 
firm.  When the acquiring firm uses a corporate name, all of the products in its portfolio are 
branded with the same name and tied to the consumers’ perception of the firm (Jaju et al. 2006). 
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When this link between brand and firm is strong, as in the case of a corporate brand name 
strategy, it is more likely that spillover effects will negatively impact the acquiring firm if a 
product in the portfolio performs poorly (Simonin and Ruth 1998).  In a corporate branding 
situation it is extremely difficult to incorporate a new brand into the product portfolio even if it is 
closely related to the other products in the portfolio as a brand name change will most likely 
occur.  Even if the new brand fits well with the existing products a name change implies a loss of 
equity and investors will not reward this situation (Jaju et al. 2006). 
 Conversely, when the acquired brand name has a house of brands strategy, there is no 
apparent link between the individual name and the corporate name.  In such cases, the 
consumer’s need to process information regarding the corporate-individual name link is lower, 
and the chance of a negative association between the corporate name and its branded products is 
reduced.  Therefore, we suggest that there is an interaction between fit and brand name strategy 
such that the impact of fit is greater when the acquired brand has a house of brands strategy and 
lower when the acquired brand has a corporate brand strategy (e.g., Jaju, Joiner and Reddy 
2006). 
 Furthermore, this interaction between fit and brand name strategy will differ based on the 
presence (or absence) of a strong brand management capability in the acquiring firm. The 
presence of a strong brand management capability in the acquiring firm should facilitate the 
redeployment of resources of the target brand under all conditions (Bahadir, Bharadwaj and 
Srivastava 2008). Conversely, when a weak brand management capability is present, it is 
difficult for the acquiring firm to accommodate an ill-fitting brand (Jaju et al 2006).   
To illustrate this point, consider the following two examples.  In 1998, Ocean Spray 
acquired Nantucket Nectars, a strong player in the “new age” beverage market with a 35% gross 
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margin and strong growth potential. After the acquisition, sales remained below $100 million 
and profits were slim. By trying to avoid a fate similar to that of Quaker Oats and Snapple, 
Ocean Spray followed a “hands-off” approach and let the founders of the Nantucket Nectars 
company continue to operate the firm independent of Ocean Spray. Unfortunately Nantucket 
Nectars lacked the resources necessary to capitalize on the brand’s strengths and grow the 
business.  Due to a struggling parent brand, Ocean Spray did not step in to help, and just 4 years 
later, Ocean Spray sold Nantucket Nectar’s to Cadbury.   
In contrast, the acquisition of St. Joseph’s aspirin by Johnson & Johnson was a 
resounding success.  Purchased from Schering-Plough Corp in 2000 for only $2.5 million, St. 
Joseph Aspirin was a dormant brand with miniscule revenue. Historically, St. Joseph Aspirin had 
been a strong brand in households in the 1940s and 1950s; however, in the 1960s the product 
suffered when aspirin related products were linked to Reyes syndrome in children.  Attempting 
to capitalize on the childhood memories and nostalgia of baby boomers, J&J revitalized the 
brand as a once-a-day medication to reduce the risk of heart attacks.  Within a year of the 
acquisition, St. Joseph’s distribution increased from 12% to 95% and sales were $20 million.   
When comparing these two examples, it is clear that the brand management capability of 
J&J was much stronger than that of Ocean Spray.  J&J was able to capitalize on the expertise of 
marketers in their firm, appropriately design and implement advertising and promotional 
strategies to their target market, and gain access to retailers and shelf-space to due existing 
relationships.  We postulate that when the acquiring firm has a strong brand management 
capability, the acquiring firm will be better able to transition a newly purchased brand into the 
firm’s existing product portfolio than if a brand management capability is weak. Additionally, 
based on our earlier argument that it is harder to incorporate a newly purchased brand into a firm 
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with a corporate branding strategy versus one with a house of brands strategy (Jaju, Joiner and 
Reddy 2006), it seems logical that the presence of a brand management capability can ease this 
transition and lessen any negative effects.  A strong brand management capability can overcome 
the challenges posed by lack of fit. Therefore, we posit:  
H3:   There is a three-way interaction between brand management strength, fit 
and brand name strategy. Specifically, we posit that the two-way interaction 
of fit and brand name strategy will vary based on the presence of the 
strength of the brand management capability in the acquirer firm such that:  
 
H3a:   When the acquirer’s brand management capability is weak, the 
interaction of fit and brand name strategy will be significant. 
Specifically, a high (low) level of fit has a greater positive (negative) 
impact on abnormal returns when the acquirer employs a house of 
brands strategy versus when the acquirer uses a corporate brand 
strategy.  
 
H3b:   When the acquirer’s brand management capability is strong, the 
interaction of fit and brand name strategy will not be significant.  
 
Acquirer Brand Management Capability, Fit and Acquirer Diversification. The fit 
between the acquired brand and the acquirer has a lower impact when the acquirer has a highly 
diversified portfolio. A diversified acquirer is likely to be viewed as having a proven ability to 
succeed in managing a variety of unrelated businesses, thereby minimizing the role of fit. In this 
case, investors are likely to evaluate a poor fitting brand acquisition less harshly than when the 
acquirer has a narrower portfolio.   
Furthermore, it is likely that an acquiring firm’s brand management capability will also 
moderate this relationship between fit and diversification.  Because a strong brand management 
capability allows the acquiring firm to better integrate a new brand into its product portfolio, the 
impacts of fit and diversification will be much less important.  The acquiring firm can use its 
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currently available resources to capitalize on the strengths of the target brand.  For example, J.M. 
Smuckers Co., a firm with a moderate to low degree of diversification purchased Jif peanut 
butter and Crisco from Procter & Gamble in 2001 for $1 billion. While it may be argued that Jif 
“fit” with Smuckers due to the classic complementarity between jelly and peanut butter, Crisco 
was certainly a very different type of product.  However, due to their excellent brand 
management skills, Smucker’s was able to exploit the brand strength of Crisco and Jif, and 
profits rose 87% in the first quarter of 2002. 
When a strong brand management capability is missing, an acquirer with a high degree of 
diversification is likely to have established an ability to manage unrelated businesses, 
compensating for the absence of a superior brand management capability.  Given their 
diversified portfolios, such firms should be equally capable of managing both high and low fit 
brand acquisitions.  In contrast, when the brand acquiring firm has a narrow portfolio, its ability 
to manage a high fit brand acquisition is likely to be greater than its ability to manage low fit 
brand acquisitions    It could be that a firm with a narrow portfolio (i.e., less diversified firm) is 
organized around one or two core competencies critical to its success within a given industry; 
when acquiring a target firm within the same industry, it is in a better position to apply these core 
competencies to derive greater success from the brand acquisition. -Therefore, we posit:   
H4:   There is a three-way interaction between brand management strength, fit 
and diversification. Specifically, we posit that the two-way interaction of fit 
and diversification will vary based on the presence of a brand management 
capability in the acquirer firm.  
 
H4a:  When the acquirer’s brand management capability is weak, the 
interaction of fit and diversification will be significant. Specifically, a 
high (low) level of fit has a greater positive (negative) impact on 
abnormal returns when the acquirer has a low level of diversification 
versus when the acquirer has a high level of diversification.    
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H4b:   When the acquirer’s brand management capability is strong, the 
interaction of fit and brand name strategy will not be significant. 
2.2 METHOD 
We use an event study approach to investigate when acquisitions create value. The use of event 
study methodology to study the effects of marketing announcements is widespread (e.g., Chaney, 
Devinny and Winer 1991; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Lane and Jacobson 1995; Swaminathan 
and Moorman 2009). Because of market efficiency, the examination of abnormal or excess stock 
returns provides unbiased estimates of the future earnings (change in market value) generated by 
the announcement event (Fama 1970). The methodological assumptions -- grounded in financial 
theory and supported by empirical research -- are that investors will:  (1) rapidly assimilate the 
implications of an acquisition announcement; (2) collectively predict long-term future cash flows 
(both on the revenue and cost sides); and (3) either buy or sell, depending on whether their 
expectations indicate that the stock price is too high or too low. Thus, the change in stock price 
following a brand acquisition announcement provides a market-wide, unbiased estimate of the 
future long-term earnings from the acquisition. 
Data  
 We use a comprehensive dataset of acquisition announcements drawn from the SDC 
Platinum Database.  The initial sample contained all mergers and acquisitions from 1990 to early 
2009 in three business- to- consumer industries that traditionally offer branded products (health 
and beauty, food and beverage, pharmaceutical industries).  We chose these industries because 
firms within them typically undertake a large amount of marketing activity towards consumers, 
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and as a result brands can potentially play a strong role in influencing consumers’ purchases. In 
order to estimate the excess stock returns, the sample was reduced to be comprised of acquirer 
firms publicly traded in the United States.  The sample was then coded based on the 
announcement of the transaction.  Each acquisition was labeled based on the deal synopsis as 
dealing with brands, products, research and development, manufacturing and distribution or 
unknown.  The agreement between two coders was 92% and all disagreements were resolved by 
discussion.  Fortunately no announcements contained more than one reason for the transaction.  
843 acquisitions were discarded because the announcement did not describe the reason 
for the transaction.  Because many of the target firms were not public companies additional data 
points were discarded due to lack of data for the independent variables.  For example 122 brand 
acquisitions were coded; however 27 were discarded as the price or cost of the transaction was 
not released and the target brand strength variable could not be calculated.  Ten additional brand 
transactions were discarded due to the lack of data for various other variables.  The final sample 
consisted of 68 acquisitions for products, 38 for R&D, 48 for manufacturing and distribution and 
85 brand acquisitions.   
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR).Using standard event study 
methodology, a firm’s abnormal returns that are the consequence of an acquisition 
announcement can be calculated using the Fama-French model (Carhart 1997). We use daily data 
(drawn from the CRSP database) on the stock market returns for each of the firms in our sample 
over a 255-day period ending 90 days prior to the event day (see Brown & Warner 1985) to 
estimate the following market model (see Fama and French 1993): 
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In the above model, itr  denotes the daily returns for firm i on day t, rmt denotes the 
corresponding daily returns on the value weighted overall market index, iα  and iβ  are firm 
specific parameters, and itε  is distributed ~ N(0,1). SMBt captures the return differential between 
small and large market capitalization stocks and HMLt captures the differential between value or 
high- and growth or low-book-to-market ratio stocks.  The estimates obtained from this model 
are then used to predict the daily returns for each firm for the event day, where itrˆ  is the 
predicted daily return.  The daily firm-specific excess returns can be calculated as: itritrit ˆˆ −=ε  
Cumulative abnormal returns, CARit, are then the firm’s abnormal returns summed across 
the event window. For this study we follow general practice and define the event window as the 
day of the brand acquisition announcement plus the next day.  (Alternative event windows were 
also calculated; our results are robust across the choice of time frame.) 
Independent Variables 
Brand Name Strength. There is no single approach to measurement of brand strength in 
the literature, and a variety of methods have been proposed (e.g., Simon and Sullivan 1990; Park 
and Srinivasan 1994). Therefore, we used two separate approaches to measure brand name 
strength of the target brand, and then combined them via a principal components analysis to 
create a single index of target brand strength.  
The first input measure involves using the monetary value of the acquisition paid for by 
the acquiring firm (Mahajan, Rao and Srivastava 1994). The value of the transaction was found 
using several methods including 10K, 10Q, and 8K reports along with popular press releases.   
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However, this use of total acquisition value as a measure of brand strength is incomplete, 
because it does not account for tangible assets that may accompany the acquisition (e.g., plant, 
equipment); these tangible assets are not attributable to brand name strength. In order to correctly 
account for tangible assets, similar to the approach suggested by Simon and Sullivan (1991), we 
divide the acquisition value by total assets, which creates an index of intangible target value 
similar to Tobin’s q. In order to compute this measure, we needed to obtain data on tangible 
assets that were included in the transaction. Data on this is not uniformly available for all the 
acquisitions in our sample, because many target firms within the sample are privately owned. 
Therefore, we difference the acquirer tangible assets in the quarter prior to and following the 
brand acquisition. This difference is treated as a proxy for the target tangible assets acquired in 
the transaction. 
Using this measure of tangible assets, we divide the acquisition value by the change in 
total assets for the acquiring firm before and after the acquisition.  The use of total assets in the 
denominator allows us to compare the intangible value of the brand across various brand 
acquisitions after accounting for tangible assets that were exchanged as part of the brand 
acquisition. This difference in acquirer total assets (proxy for assets acquired in the transaction) 
was pulled from the Compustat database.  Thismethodology provides a reasonable although 
imperfect proxy of the brand name strength of the brand in an acquisition context.  
The second measure of brand strength we employ is a qualitative measure. Specifically, 
two brand experts were given a list of the brand acquisitions used in our study and asked to rate 
the acquired brands or set of brands as either strong (1) or weak (0).  Agreement between the 
raters was 92%, and all differences were resolved through discussion. The two measures which 
were correlated at .13 were subject to principal components analysis and the first principal 
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component (with an eigenvalue of 1.13) was used as an overall operationalization of brand 
strength.  
Fit. Fit was assessed based on whether the acquirer’s primary industry is the same as that 
of the target .  Compustat reports the 4-digit SIC code associated with each public acquirer.  A 
search of Hoover’s database, library sources and various websites yielded specific information 
regarding the industry description and classification for the acquired brand.  The industry 
description was matched with existing Compustat category descriptions to assess the relevant 4-
digit SIC code.  When both the acquirer’s 4-digit SIC code and the brand’s SIC code matched the 
first 2 digits (e.g., 2834 and 2844), we created a dummy variable that took on the value 1 and 
remained 0 otherwise. 
Brand Name Strategy.   Brand name strategy of the acquiring firm was gauged by 
creating a dummy variable.  The dummy variable was coded as either having an individual 
(house-of-brands) strategy (0) or a corporate or mixed name strategy (1).  Independent coders 
classified the brands into categories.  The agreement between the coders was 94% and all 
disputed cases were discussed and resolved.  64% of the acquisitions involved a house of brand 
name strategy whereas 36% involved a corporate or mixed strategy.  
Acquirer’s Degree of Diversification.  SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database provides a list 
of all industries, in the form of 4-digit SIC codes, from which a given firm derives its sales for a 
given year. The acquirer’s degree of diversification was judged based on the number of distinct 
4-digit SIC codes reported in SDC for the acquirer name. Due to a very large variance in this 
variable and the small size of our sample, this variable was transformed using a median split into 
high diversification (1) and low diversification (0).   
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Brand Management Capability. The presence of brand managers or a system of brand 
management was used as evidence for the presence of a brand management capability (see Nath 
and Mahajan 2008 and Lee et. al. 2008 for a similar conceptualization).  Hoover’s was used to 
determine if the acquiring firm had a brand management system in place at the time of the 
acquisition.  A dummy variable was used, with 1 being the presence of a system (strong brand 
management capability) and 0 being no brand management system (weak brand management 
capability).   
Control Variables 
Following the work of others (e.g., Rao et al 2004), we include various control variables 
to better estimate the effects of our independent variables: an industry size ratio, age of the 
acquiring firm, target industry growth rate, the acquirer’s sales and advertising expenditures, and 
the acquirer’s operating margin. We include these variables to ensure that there are no systematic 
causes of the abnormal returns beyond the impact of the independent variables we study.   
Industry Size Ratio.  The number of firms (both public and private) listed for the primary 
SIC code of both the acquiring firm and target firms are used to capture the size of the industry 
and level of competition within which each is operating.  This information was collected from 
the Mergent Online database.  A ratio was then created, with the number of competitors in the 
acquirer’s industry divided by the number of competitors in the target’s industry to create a 
measure of relative competition.  If the ratio is small, the acquiring firm participates in an 
industry with a small number of competing firms and is purchasing a brand that competes in an 
industry with a larger number of firms.  For ratio values greater than unity, the acquiring firm has 
a larger number of competitors than the target.  As this ratio gets larger, it is expected that 
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abnormal returns will also increase, since the acquiring firm will be better able to handle the 
target brand’s competition.  
Acquirer Age.   As the time a firm has been in business increases, the accuracy of market 
evaluations of the firm improves.  This is due to the fact that investors typically have greater 
knowledge about the firm.  It has also been postulated that brand equity may increase as 
awareness and loyalty grow over time (Rao et al. 2004).  Thus, we include the age of the 
acquiring firm at the time of the acquisition, because an increase in age may lead to a greater 
abnormal return.  The age of the firm was calculated by subtracting its founding date from the 
year of the acquisition announcement.  The founding date for the acquiring firm was captured 
using several resources including company websites and LexisNexis.   
Target Industry growth rate.  A higher industry growth rate leads to the expectation of 
larger future returns.  The growth rate of the target firm’s industry is included as the 
compounded average of the last three years of sales growth prior to the brand acquisition.  Sales 
data for public firms with the same primary SIC code as the target brand were collected from the 
CompuStat database. A higher growth rate is expected to have a positive impact on the acquiring 
firm’s abnormal return.   
Acquirer Marketing Expenditures.  A firm’s marketing expenditures can act as a proxy 
for the resources available for marketing and managing an acquired brand. From Compustat, 
total selling and general administrative expense for the four quarters before the merger or 
acquisition announcement was used as a proxy for marketing expenditures (e.g., Dutta et. al. 
1999).  
Acquirer Operating margin.  We expect abnormal returns to be larger when the acquiring 
firm has a high operating margin.  Past research has shown high brand values are associated with 
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high operating margins (Barth et al. 1998).  Operating margin is calculated as the net income 
divided by revenue.   
 
Model Development  
A regression model was estimated to test the hypothesized effects.  The dependent 
variable is the abnormal stock returns accruing to the focal firm on the date of the announcement 
and one day following the announcement date (CARi): 
Abnormal Stock Returns(CAR)= ß0 + ß1 (Brand Strategy)+ß2 (Target Brand Strength)+ ß3 
(Acquirer Diversification)+ ß4 (Fit)+ ß5 (Acquirer Brand Management Capability)+ ß6 
(Fit*Manage)+ ß7 (Strategy*Fit)+ ß8 (Fit*Strategy*Manage)+ ß9 (Fit*Diversificaiton) + ß10 
(Fit*Manage*Diversification) + ß11 ( Industry Size Ratio) + ß12(Acquirer Age) + ß13(Target 
Industry Growth Rate) + ß14(Acquirer Advertising)+ ß15(Acquirer Operating Margin) + ε 
 
2.3              RESULTS 
Event Study 
An event study was conducted separately for each of the types of acquisitions.  The 
results of the event study for those acquisitions with the goal of acquiring resources in R&D, 
products, or manufacturing and distribution are summarized in Table 1.  Supporting H1a,the 
acquisitions categorized as R&D (M = .7% , n.s.) and manufacturing and distribution (M = 1.0%, 
n.s.) did not have significant abnormal returns for the day of the transaction (Day 0) plus the next 
day (Day +1).  Those acquisitions dealing with products did have marginally significant positive 
returns (M = 1.0%, p< .10).  Overall, however, the results of the event study for the acquisitions 
in this sample are consistent with previous results (King et.al. 2004; Mulherin and Boone 2000). 
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TABLE 1 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Various Acquisition Motivations 
Across Various Event Windows 
Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
 
 
Acquisition 
Type N 
Event 
Window 
Mean 
CAR t-Value 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Product 68 
(-2,+2) .006 .642 .804 
(-1,+1) .005 .802 .804 
(0,+1) .010 1.852* .319 
Research and 
Development 38 
(-2,+2) 0 -.005 .560 
(-1,+1) -.001 -.130 -.089 
(0,+1) .070 .925 .236 
Manufacturing 
and 
Distribution 
48 
(-2,+2) .009 .694 .342 
(-1,+1) .011 1.07 .920 
(0,+1) .010 1.17 .053 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the   0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a one-tailed test. 
 
Because the focus of the hypotheses is subgroup of acquisitions involving brand name 
transfers, we focus on this subset of mergers for the rest of our discussion.  Because the 
transactions involving brands will be explored in greater detail it is necessary to ensure that the 
announcement date is accurate.  To confirm the dates we searched news sources (e.g., Wall 
Street Journal) for any information regarding the brand acquisition in the six months preceding 
the formal news release.  This enabled us to accurately pinpoint the first date when the 
announcement regarding the brand acquisition was made, and also account for any leakage of 
information.   
Details of the brand acquisitions in our sample are provided in Table 2 and descriptive 
statistics are provided in Table 3. Figure 2 highlights the firms’ returns for 10 days before and 
after the event (e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Tellis and Johnson 2007).  Using a 
t-test (Brown and Warner 1985) and a one-tailed generalized Z-test statistic, our results show 
that cumulative abnormal returns are positive and significant over a number of time periods 
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supporting H1b. Table 4 reports these statistics and significance levels for various alternative 
event windows. As noted earlier, our reported model results are based on a (0, +1) window (i.e., 
a window that encompasses the day of the event (day 0) and the next day (day +1)). For this 
window (across all firms in our sample) the acquisition announcement increased stock returns by 
1.8% (t = 4.535, p < .001; z = 3.354, p < .001).  In contrast to the results highlighted in Table 1 
for acquisitions for various reasons, Table 4 indicates that the cumulative abnormal returns for 
brand acquisitions are significant across various alternative event windows. Thus, our results are 
robust to the choice of an event window, and this is substantiated by subsequent robustness 
checks using alternative event windows.  
TABLE 2 : Brand Acquisition Sample Characteristics (n=85) 
 
-
- 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Brand Acquisitions (n= 85) 
               
Variables Mean S.D. 1  2 3 4 5 6 7   0 
1.Cumulative Abnormal Returns 0.019 0.084 1.00          
2. Brand Name Strategy 
 
0.353 
 
0.481 
 -0.010          
3. Brand Strength 0.400 0.493 0.219 0.050         
4. Acquirer Diversification 0.459 0.501 -0.295 0.012 0.212        
5. Fit 0.788 0.411 0.246 -0.280 0.188 -0.101       
6. Acquirer Brand Management Capability (BMC) 0.376 0.487 0.081 0.036 0.010 -0.033 -0.013      
7. Industry Size Ratio 1.451 4.716 0.323 0.187 0.173 -0.102 0.197 -0.092     
8. Acquirer's Firm Age 47.012 
35.07
2 0.048 0.360 0.375 0.327 -0.153 -0.032 0.036    
9. Target Industry Growth Rate 0.063 0.140 0.014 -0.009 0.087 0.396 -0.046 -0.012 -0.070 0.116   
10. Acquirer's Selling & General Admin Expenditures 
(SGAE) 2110 4933 -0.091 -0.176 0.086 -0.147 0.008 -0.028 -0.013 .382 0.057  
11. Acquirer's Operating Margin 0.032 0.244 0.095 0.107 -0.032 0.009 -0.057 0.165 0.072 .231 .003 .191 
Note:  Numbers in boldface are significant at p < .05. Numbers in italics are significant at p<.10 
Average Price of Acquisition $681 Million 
Average Number of Brands Sold in each Transaction 1.7 
Number of Acquisitions per Industry:  
     Health and Beauty 30 
     Food and Beverage 54 
     Pharmaceuticals  17 
Average Size of Acquiring Firm (Market Cap) $15.3 Billion 
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TABLE 4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Brand Acquisitions 
Across Various Event Windows 
Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
 
 
Event Window M SD t-Value Generalized Sign Z 
(-2,+2) .026 .107 4.057*** 2.486** 
(-1,+1) .019 .094 3.841*** 1.617* 
(-1,0) .014 .062 3.453*** 2.269** 
(-2,+1) .025 .095 3.374*** 2.269 ** 
(-1,+2) .020 .095 3.489*** 2.269** 
(0,+1) .019 .085 4.535*** 3.354*** 
(-3,+1) .021 .097 3.335*** 1.836  * 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the   0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
 using a one-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Average Daily Abnormal Returns Surrounding a Brand Acquisition Announcement 
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Regression Analysis 
Our overall model (reported in Table 5) is significant (F (17, 67)= 3.39, p < .001). The 
overall R2 of .46 and adjusted R2 = .33 suggests that the model has good explanatory power. 
Among the control variables, the only one that is significant is the industry size ratio (β = -.008, 
p< .0001).  None of the other controls (target industry growth rate, acquirer age, acquirer’s sales 
and advertising expenditure, acquirer’s operation margin) is significant. 
TABLE 5:   Factors Influencing Abnormal Returns After a Brand Acquisition (N=85) 
  Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t-value 
 
Significance 
     
Intercept -0.146 0.052 -2.81 < .05 
     
Brand Strength (H2) .018 0.002 9.00 < .01 
Brand Name Strategy 0.072 0.049 1.47  
Acquirer Diversification 0.104 0.053 1.96 <.1 
Fit 0.207 0.054 3.83 < .01 
Acquirer Brand Management Capability (BMC) 0.346 0.093 3.72 < .01 
Brand Name Strategy * BMC -0.242 0.099 -2.44 < .05 
Fit * BMC -0.376 0.095 -3.96 < .01 
Fit * Strategy -0.133 0.055 -2.42 < .05 
Fit * BMC * Strategy (H3) 0.265 0.107 2.48 < .05 
Acquirer Diversification * Fit -0.171 0.056 -3.05 < .01 
Acquirer Diversification * BMC -0.162 0.079 -2.05 < .05 
Acquirer Diversification * Fit * BMC (H4) 0.203 0.087 2.33 < .05 
     
Control Variables     
Industry Size Ratio .0077 0.0019 4.05 < .01 
Acquirer's Age 0.0003 0.0003 1.00  
Target Industry Growth Rate -.0322 .06 0.54  
Acquirer's Sales & Advertising Expenditure -.000002 .000002 -1.00  
Acquirer's Operating Margin .035 .034 1.03  
     
R-Square 0.463    
Adjusted R-Square 0.326    
F-value (17,67) 3.39    < .01 
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Turning to the independent variables, the results show that the effect of brand strength on 
abnormal returns is significant (β = .018, p < .05), supporting H2.  As brand strength increases, 
positive abnormal returns increase as well. Also, confirming previous findings we find several 
conditional effects to be significant including the fit between the acquiring firm and target brand 
(e.g., Singh and Motegomery 1987) (β = .207, p< .001), and the presence of a brand management 
capability for the acquiring firm (Day 1994) (β = .346, p<.001).  The level of diversification of 
the acquiring firm is marginally significant (β = .104, p < .10), while the type of brand strategy 
implemented by the acquiring firm is not significant (β = .072, ns).  Regarding the interaction 
effects, significant two-way interactions exist between the acquiring firms level of diversification 
and its brand management capability (β = -.162, p< .05) and the acquirer’s brand strategy and its 
brand management capability (β = -.242, p< .05). Also, we find three significant two-way 
interactions involving the acquiring firm - target brand fit variable -- between (1) fit and the 
presence of a brand management capability (β = -.376, p< .001); (2) fit and the acquirer’s brand 
strategy (β = -.133, p< .05); and (3) fit and the acquirer’s level of diversification (β = -.171, p< 
.01).  However, the two way interactions are of only marginal interest as the three-way 
interactions discussed next allow for a more detailed understanding of the factors influencing 
abnormal returns surrounding a brand acquisition.    
Most importantly, the two 3-way interactions predicted by H3 and H4 are significant.  
First, the three-way interaction between the fit, acquiring firm’s brand management capability, 
and brand strategy variables (β = .265, p< .05) is significant, supporting H3. Second, the three-
way interaction between fit, brand management capability, and diversification is also significant 
(β = .203, p< .05), supporting H4.   
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To more fully understand the nature of these three-way interactions, we conducted 
additional analyses using the procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991). As can be 
seen in Figure 3a, when the brand management capability is strong, the interaction of fit and 
brand strategy is not significant (β = .048,  ns), as predicted by H3b. In contrast, and as seen in 
Figure 3b, when the brand management capability is weak, there is a significant interaction 
between fit and brand strategy (β = -.153, p < .05). Analysis of simple slopes reveals that when a 
firm has a weak brand management capability, the impact of fit between acquirer and target 
firms is significant when the acquirer also follows a house of brands strategy (β=.072, p < .05). 
As can be seen in Figure 3b, acquirer firms with a house of brands strategy benefit significantly 
from having a high fit with the target versus acquiring firms with low fit (Mlow fit=-.13 versus 
Mhigh fit=.12, p<.05). This implies that for an average firm in our sample with a market 
capitalization of $14.8 billion, an acquisition of a low-fitting brand when brand management is 
weak will result in a loss of $1.93 billion, versus an acquisition of a brand with high fit which 
leads to an increase of $1.78.In contrast, acquirers with a corporate brand strategy benefit to a 
lesser extent from brand acquisitions of targets with a high fit (Mlow fit=-.07 versus Mhigh fit=.03, 
ns). Taken together, these results provide strong support for the hypothesized effects under H3.  
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A. Fit, Brand Name Strategy and Firms with Strong Brand Management Capability 
 
 
B. Fit, Brand Name Strategy and Firms with Weak Brand Management Capability 
 
FIGURE 3 
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Using the same method (Aiken and West 1991) we also explored in greater detail the 
nature of the three-way interaction between fit, the brand management capability, and the 
acquiring firm’s level of diversification. Looking at Figure 4a and 4b, one can see that in the 
presence of a strong brand management capability, the interaction between fit and acquirer’s 
diversification is not significant (β = -.006,  ns). In contrast, and as shown in Figure 4b, when the 
brand management capability is weak, there is an interaction of fit and diversification (β = -.212, 
p < .01).  Analysis of simple slopes reveals that when the acquirer is highly diversified, fit does 
not have a significant impact (β = .030, n.s.). In contrast, when the acquirer has a narrow scope 
and is less diversified, there is a significant impact of fit (β =.078, p<.05). As can be seen in 
Figure 4b, when the brand management capability is weak, narrowly focused acquirers 
experience higher abnormal returns under high fit than under low fit (Mlow fit=-.12 versus Mhigh 
fit=.11, p<.05).  In monetary terms, an acquisition of a low-fitting brand when brand management 
is weak will result in a loss of $1.78 billion, versus an acquisition of a brand with high fit which 
leads to an increase of $1.63 billion.In contrast, when the brand management capability isweak, 
acquirers that are highly diversified experience no significant increases in cumulative abnormal 
returns from high fit (Mlow fit=-.05 versus Mhigh fit=.01, ns).  
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A. Fit and Acquirer Diversification for Firms with Strong Brand Management 
Capability 
 
 
B. Fit and Acquirer Diversification for Firms with Weak Brand Management 
Capability 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
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In summary, when a management capability is weak, the impact of fit is greater; 
specifically, when brand management is weak and fit is low, brands belonging to less diversified  
firms experience greater negative abnormal returns than when fit is high. These effects do not 
hold when brand management capability is strong Taken together, the above results provide 
strong support for the hypothesized effects under H4.   
 
2.4      DISCUSSION 
A company’s brand portfolio serves a critically important role in connecting it with 
customers and markets, in protecting it from competitors, and in providing an important source 
of value (Morgan and Rego 2009). Historically, brand portfolios were largely built internally by 
firms. However, the costs of internal brand development have skyrocketed (e.g., the costs of 
developing a new product internally for a packaged goods firm in the U.S. ranges from $100-
$200 million, while costs in the pharmaceutical industry ranges from $600 to $800 million).  
Furthermore, there are significant risks associated with product failure; specifically, it is known 
thatapproximately 50% of all new products introduced in a given year fail (e.g., Business Week 
1993; Zirger and Maidique 1990). In contrast, brand acquisitions offer an efficient way for firms 
to expand into new target market segments and enhance their product portfolios while following 
a lower risk strategy (i.e., the acquired brands have already proven themselves in the 
marketplace, and have an existing consumer base that accept the brand).  
Despite its importance as a corporate strategy, the external acquisition of brands presents 
its own set of challenges. The acquired brand(s) must be managed carefully and integrated into 
the product portfolio of the acquirer. Issues of synergy and fit must be considered carefully prior 
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to the acquisition. Given this, the present research offers some insights regarding the value 
creation potential of brand acquisitions. Using the stock market’s reaction to brand acquisition 
announcements as a guide, we attempt to model the difference between success and failure of a 
brand acquisition. Successful brand acquisitions, it appears, depend on a variety of acquirer and 
acquisition characteristics.  Previous work by Wiles, Morgan and Rego (2011) found that overall 
firm marketing capabilities increase the abnormal returns of a brand acquisition.   Our work 
builds upon this finding by specifically looking at many of the brandvariables which may be 
either subsumed or absent from the “marketing capability” variable.  We have found that brand 
name strategy, brand management capability, brand strength, diversification, and fit all play a 
role in the success of a brand acquisition.   Most importantly the two three-way interactions 
between brand management capability, diversification, and brand name strategy and between 
brand management capability, fit and brand name strategy provide a more in-depth analysis of 
when a brand acquisition is successful from the standpoint of investors.   
Past research within marketing has typically focused on issues of fit from a consumer 
perspective (e.g., Simonin and Ruth 1998) or from a strategy perspective (e.g., Swaminathan et 
al. 2008). However, the present research suggests that the importance of fit can vary based on the 
type of brand name strategy employed and the acquirer firm’s characteristics (diversification and 
brand management capability). Firms with a strong brand management capability can overcome 
lack of fit in a brand acquisition. Thus, distinct from past research (e.g., Hitt et al. 2001, Makri  
et al. 2010) , we argue that lack-of-fit between the acquirer and target may not necessarily be a 
hindrance to acquisition success. Firms can compensate for lack of fit by having a strong brand 
management capability. 
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Our results also extend the prior work by Rao, Agarwal and Dahlhoff (2004) on corporate 
name strategy. Rao et al. demonstrate that use of a corporate branding strategy is associated with 
higher shareholder value (in the form of Tobin’sq), and that use of a mixed branding strategy is 
associated with lower firm value. They conclude that using a corporate brand name outperform a 
house-of-brands approach, perhaps because the financial community has a greater awareness of 
corporate brand names than the smaller brands that comprise a typical house-of-brands portfolio.  
We show here that the impact of the brand name strategy used by the acquirer may have 
implications for brand acquisition success as well. Specifically, when the acquiring company has 
a single brand name for all its products, a newly acquired brand will have to be renamed in order 
to fit with this strategy. Stated differently, the acquisition of a new brand is akin to introducing a 
brand extension for the acquirer’s corporate brand name and is much more difficult than if the 
acquiring firm followed a house of brands strategy.  Therefore, we support previous work in the 
context of brand extensions (e.g., Aaker and Keller 1990; Keller and Aaker 1992), by 
demonstrating the contingent role of fit within the brand acquisition context. We also extend the 
consumer-based findings of Jaju, Joiner and Reddy (2006) to a stock market setting. We 
demonstrate that expectations of investors concerning potential name changes implied by a brand 
name strategy can have significant implications for value creation.  
What happens when the acquirer follows a house-of-brands strategy? The financial 
community may be less concerned about potential changes in brand name of the acquired brand 
when the acquirer follows a house-of-brands strategy. Given that the acquirer follows a strategy 
where each brand has its own distinct brand name and identity, the financial community may 
perceive that the newly acquired brand will also be allowed to retain its separate brand identity 
(both name and other important brand elements). A well-fitting brand will be easily incorporated 
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into the portfolio.  We find that there is a significant impact of fit when the acquirer has a house-
of-brands strategy and when there is a weak brand management capability. 
Our results also point to the important role of the acquirer’s diversification in moderating 
the impact of fit among firms with a weak brand capability. Previous strategy research has shown 
that diversified firms are not valued highly by the financial community (Anand and Singh 1997, 
Montgomery 1985; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales2000). We extend these findings by showing 
that diversification does not always weaken firm value. Specifically, if the firm has a strong 
organizational structure that supports brand names, then neither diversification nor fit appear to 
weaken the value created following brand acquisition announcements. In contrast, when the firm 
does not have an organizational structure focused on managing brands (e.g., a formal brand 
management system), then issues of fit and diversification become important. Specifically, the 
value creation potential is highest for a narrowly focused firm that acquires a highly related 
brand (i.e., fit is high), and lowest when a narrowly focused firm acquires an unrelated brand. 
Although there is an effect of fit with high-fitting brand acquisitions outperforming less-fitting 
brand acquisitions, the impact of fit in the case of a diversified firm is a lot lower than its impact 
for a narrowly focused, less diversified firm. Presumably, the financial community views a 
firm’s track record of managing disparate businesses as a useful indicator of its ability to 
minimizes the negative consequences of acquiring a poor-fitting brand. 
When brand management capability is weak, senior managers contemplating an 
acquisition must place particular emphasis on synergies between the acquirer and target. Brand 
managers must evaluate these synergies differently against the backdrop of the organization’s 
characteristics (e.g., diversification) and its brand name approach (corporate branding versus 
house of brands); we demonstrate that these factors moderate the role of synergy in an 
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acquisition context. We focus on a particular type of synergy, i.e., the extent to which the 
acquirer and target are in similar industries. However, other sources of synergy (type of brand 
positioning strategy, synergy in advertising and pricing strategy) should also be evaluated 
carefully.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The findings presented here provide a framework for managers who use brand 
acquisitions to grow their product portfolio. Because managing brand equity is important in an 
acquisition context, it is important for a manager to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
drivers of brand equity of the target. In other words, what brand elements (e.g., brand name, 
slogan, jingle, logo, or packaging) are essential to maintaining the brand equity of the target 
brand? How integral is brand name awareness to maintaining the brand equity of the target? 
What brand associations are fundamental to the vitality of the brand? As the Snapple case study 
illustrates, misjudging the drivers of brand equity can result in failure of a brand acquisition. 
Therefore, companies which have a capability for brand management, wherein brand managers 
are responsible for continually managing a brand’s equity, may be well-placed to manage an 
acquisition as well. Future research should examine the role of brand managers in enhancing the 
success of brand acquisitions.  
One direction for future research would be to explore the relationship between brand 
management capabilities and fit in greater detail.  While the results of this work do not show a 
significant interaction when brand management capability is high, the plots of the results 
(Figures 3a and 4a) lend one to ponder if there is in fact an impact of fit that is not being 
captured.  In both the case of brand name strategy and diversification, the “low fitting” 
acquisitions are outperforming those of high fit.  This contradicts previous research which has 
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shown that an increase in diversification is usually not rewarded.  It may be possible that when 
brand management capabilities are high, investors are actually rewarding the expansion of the 
firm’s product or brand line because the acquiring firm has the capabilities in place to 
incorporate the new brand into the product line.  This seems especially true for firms using a 
house of brands strategy (Figure 3a).  The firm is already handling multiple brand names, so it is 
assumed that they also can handle a varied product line was well.   
One limitation of this work is that we look only at three broad product categories.  It may 
be possible that the effects of this study would change for other industries.  By looking at only 
health and beauty, food and beverage, and pharmaceutical industries, we are focusing on 
industries that have traditionally relied heavily on the use of brands and other marketing tools to 
sell products to end consumers.  Brand mergers and acquisitions that take place in the business-
to-business context may not be affected by the same firm characteristics (or in the same way that 
they are here). We also only look at physical products and not service industries.  One possible 
avenue for future research, then, would be to determine if the factors affecting firm value 
following a brand merger or acquisition are different when both the acquiring and target firms 
are in a service industry or if the factors differ when the firms differ on a product versus service 
focus.  The marketing and brand management resources needed to successfully manage a service 
differ compared to a product, and this may have implications for how investors view such 
acquisitions.   
Further, we focus on only one aspect of synergy between the target and acquirer (i.e., the 
match in industry type). There may be other sources of synergy between the firms that may 
influence value creation. For instance, cultural differences between the acquired brand and the 
target may cause issues in the post-acquisition integration phase. Often, pooling of production 
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facilities, distribution or media are simply not possible due to culture clashes between the two 
organizations. Thus, future research should focus on an expanded operationalization of the 
various forms of synergies that are important in the brand acquisition context. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Brand acquisitions are a popular strategy for firms that want to limit development costs 
and reap the benefits of existing brands. However, such brand acquisitions often fail, and must 
thus be undertaken wisely, with a keen understanding of the type of brand and how it should be 
managed. We have provided a framework for brand acquisition success based on brand strength, 
brand fit, brand name strategy, firm diversification, and brand management capability. These, in 
addition to other previously identified considerations can make the difference between success 
and failure in the brand acquisition context.  
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3.0  ESSAY 2 :  CO-BRANDING ARRANGEMENTS AND PARTNERSELECTION: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MANAGERIAL GUIDLINES 
AT&T’s iPhone-based calling plans, Disney toy characters at McDonald’s, Nike sneakers with 
iPod hook-ups, and Lenovo laptops with Intel Inside are all examples of co-branding, a strategy 
in which two or more brands are intentionally “combined into a joint product and/or marketed 
together in some fashion” (Kotler and Keller 2009, p. 337).2  Use of two or more brands in 
combination can take various forms, and they can all influence brand evaluation and accessibility 
by leveraging the core competency of the partner, deterring competition, appealing to new 
market segments, and, more generally, creating synergy (Blackett and Boad 1999).  However, 
firms must proceed with caution because “if [the customers’] experience is not positive – even if 
it is the other brand’s fault – it may reflect negatively on [the focal brand]” (McKee 2009, p. 3.). 
While prior research has outlined the costs and benefits of co-branding, (e.g., Park, Jun, 
and Shocker 1996; Simonin and Ruth 1998), this article aims to provide a more integrative 
understanding of co-branding leading to managerial guidelines on “how” and “with whom” to 
co-brand (i.e., the type of co-branding arrangement and the characteristics of the partner).  We do 
                                                 
2 This definition is consistent with others in the literature.  For example, Blackett and Boad (1999) define co-branding as a strategy that 
encompasses “a wide range of marketing activity involving the use of two (and sometimes more) brands.”  Rao, Qu, and Ruekert (1999, p. 
259) define the synonymous term “brand alliance” as “all circumstances in which two or more brands are presented jointly to the 
consumer.”  According to Simonin and Ruth (1998, p. 30), it is “the short- or long-term association or combination of two or more 
individual brands, products, and/or other distinctive proprietary assets.”  Consistent with these definitions, a straightforward retail pass-
through (e.g., Pringles through Wal-Mart) is not considered co-branding. 
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this by drawing on a range of co-branding examples, interviews with managers, research on co-
branding and related strategies, and work on attribution and categorization for a conceptual 
rationale for the choice of co-branding arrangements and partners under different conditions. 
In particular, we note three aspects of this research that contribute to the co-branding 
literature.  First, we develop a typology based on the degree of integration in the co-branding 
arrangement.  The co-branding literature typically focuses on particular types of co-branding.  
Park, Jun, and Shocker’s (1996) example of Slim-Fast cake mix by Godiva represents a new, co-
developed product in which the brands are completely integrated in form and function.  
Similarly, Helmig, Huber, and Leeflang (2008) focus on long-term alliances that result in a 
single co-branded product (e.g., Sony Ericsson mobile phones).  In contrast, Samu, Krishnan, 
and Smith (1999) consider co-promotions such as Fruit of the Loom and Dodge Ram 
advertisements, which are the joint presentation of brands that retain their separate form, 
function, and identity.  Affinity partnering (Swaminathan and Reddy 2000) works in similar 
fashion.  Venkatesh and Mahajan’s (1997) component branding problem examines Compaq PCs 
with Intel Inside, a case in which the brands are physically distinguishable but functionally 
intertwined, and Stremersch and Tellis (2002) study bundles that contain separate products, such 
as Dell PCs with Lexmark printers, in which the brands have both individual and joint utility. 
This range of possible co-branding arrangements provides the impetus for our typology in 
which we identify six possible levels of co-branding based on the degree of integration of the 
partnering brands.  We draw on this typology, along with two other dimensions of the co-
branding arrangement—exclusivity (single versus multiple partnerships) and duration—to derive 
propositions about the impact of the type of co-branding arrangement on the evaluation and 
accessibility of the focal brand – the brand (or its manager or manufacturer) that is seeking 
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answers to the type of co-branding arrangement it should pursue and the type of brand(s) it 
should choose to partner.   
Second, from a process standpoint, we apply the mechanisms of attribution and 
categorization to the co-branding context.  Specifically, attribution theory (e.g., Folkes 1988; 
Kelley 1967) provides the conceptual anchor for our propositions related to the impact on focal 
brand evaluation, and categorization serves as the theoretical support for our propositions on 
focal brand accessibility.  While categorization has been invoked in the brand extension literature 
(e.g., Desai and Keller 2002; Morrin 1999), we are not aware of the application of attribution in a 
co-branding context.  In this regard, consider a co-promotion between Hilton and Delta Airlines.  
The degree of integration between the partners is low, and the locus of attribution for any 
observed outcome is arguably with one brand or the other.  Thus, an unsatisfactory experience on 
a Delta flight is unlikely to induce a customer to assign any blame to Hilton.  In contrast, in the 
case of a more highly integrated relationship, (e.g., Ford Explorer with Firestone tires), it is more 
difficult to assign or allocate blame in the event of poor performance of the co-branded offering, 
causing even the “innocent” brand to suffer (as in the rollover incidents in 2000).  Similarly, the 
two other dimensions of the co-branding arrangement—exclusivity and duration—are related to 
the attribution elements of locus, control, and stability. 
Categorization provides an understanding of how customers organize objects (Loken, 
Barsalou, and Joiner 2007) and how they store product-related information in memory and 
retrieve it later (see Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991).  The type of co-branding arrangement 
has a bearing on the strength and number of linkages among category elements.  A memory- or 
stimulus-based cue of one brand could aid the retrieval of the other and thus affect brand 
accessibility. 
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Third, we develop a set of theoretically grounded propositions that examine the direct 
link among three dimensions of the co-branding arrangement—integration, exclusivity, and 
duration—and the outcome measures of evaluation and accessibility from the focal brand’s 
perspective.  We posit that a co-branding arrangement that is highly integrated, exclusive, and 
long-term is more likely to enhance (or diminish) focal brand evaluation.  A highly integrated, 
long-term co-branding arrangement, with multiple partners, is likely to enhance focal brand 
accessibility.  Additional propositions consider the moderating influence of three partner 
characteristics—namely, the symmetry between the partner and focal brands on hedonic and 
functional attributes (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982) and the breadth of the partner brand(s) 
(diversity of association with product categories).  Together, these propositions guide managerial 
decisions on the choice of co-branding arrangement and partner(s). 
Our focus is not on whether firms should co-brand but rather on how and with whom to 
form a co-branding arrangement.  We limit our attention to demand-side drivers of co-branding 
and thus do not cover supply-side factors, such as technology, production, and financial 
synergies.  Though driven by real-world examples and perspectives from practicing managers, 
this research is entirely conceptual, and the propositions we develop on the basis of our 
framework are meant to be normative in nature. 
We note three distinct components to our research approach.  First, we created a “large” 
pool of co-branding examples from the real world.  For each example, we found at least one 
article from the popular press that detailed the rationales for co-branding and/or the performance 
outcomes.  The inspiration for our typology of co-branding arrangements came primarily from 
this effort.  Second, to develop our theoretical underpinnings, we reviewed the related literature 
on social psychology and consumer behavior, paying particular attention to the work on causal 
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attribution and categorization.  We further drew on research on co-branding and brand 
management.  This effort clarified the processes that might facilitate or inhibit the success of co-
branding and the variables that moderate the main relationships.  Third, with a view toward more 
firmly relating our work to business practice, we conducted personal interviews with 26 
managers and one former business school dean, all of whom had firsthand experience in co-
branding involving their own brands.  A list of the interviewees’ backgrounds, the interview 
process, and the interview protocol appears in the Appendix.  (We refer to salient insights from 
these interviews throughout this article.) 
The rest of the paper has the following structure:  We first develop our typology of co-
branding arrangement types.  Next, we define our outcome variables and discuss the underlying 
processes of attribution and categorization in the co-branding context.  In the following section, 
we propose our conceptual model and develop propositions on co-branding arrangement types 
and partner characteristics, including the impact of moderating effects.  We then discuss the 
managerial implications of our conceptual framework and propositions.  We conclude with a 
summary of our contributions and an examination of avenues for further research.  
3. 1:  A TYPOLOGY OF CO-BRANDING ARRANGEMENTS 
To address questions regarding how and with whom a firm should co-brand, we must identify the 
range of co-branding arrangements and the associated mechanisms.  In this section, we present 
three dimensions of the co-branding arrangement: integration, exclusivity, and duration.  We 
view our categorization scheme based on the degree of integration of the partnering brands as 
original and significant.  As we discussed previously, most co-branding articles focus on 
particular types (or a subset of types) of co-branding, such as co-promotion.   
 52 
Varadarajan and Rajaratnam’s (1986) article on symbiotic marketing takes a broad 
perspective and proposes various structural elements of co-branding.  Two of that study’s 
variables, number of relationships and time frame, correspond to our dimensions of co-branding 
(exclusivity and duration).  Beyond our distinctive typology based on co-branding, our work 
differs significantly in that we take a normative focus on which co-branding arrangements a focal 
firm should pursue, drawing on process mechanisms (attribution and categorization) to argue 
why alternative co-branding arrangements may or may not work.3 
Co-branding Integration 
The degree of co-branding integration captures the extent to which the brands are 
interconnected in form and function.  Although co-branding is the joint presentation of two or 
more brands with a strategic or tactical intent, the extent of integration can span the spectrum 
from (almost) completely self-standing to completely fused together.  Co-location exemplifies 
one end of the spectrum, in which the two brands are completely separated in form and function.  
At the other end, co-development represents brands that are highly integrated or conjoined in 
multiple ways. 
                                                 
3 Helmig, Huber, and Leeflang (2008) also compare alternative branding strategies; however, our conceptualization differs in meaning and scope.  
In contrast with our typology and associated implications, they restrict their view of co-branding to long-term alliances “in which one product is 
branded and identified simultaneously by two brands” (p. 360, emphasis added).  Furthermore, their typology of branding strategies is based on 
differences in types of expenditures, while our co-branding integration typology has entirely different underpinnings.   
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TABLE 6 
Co-branding Types Tied to Degree of Integration and Associated Characteristics 
 
Hierarchy 
of Types 
Characteristics of the Cobranded Offering 
Real-World Examples 
Cocreated 
Physically 
Inseparable 
Functionally 
Inseparable 
Tie-in 
(Forced) 
Sales 
Discount for 
Copurchase 
More 
Variety/  
Less 
Search 
 
High 
Co-
development 
√ 
(Yes) √ √ √ × × 
• Sony Ericsson wireless 
handsets 
• Nike + iPod Sport Kit for 
workouts 
• Krups–Heineken BeerTender 

  D
eg
re
e 
of
 C
o-
br
an
di
ng
 In
te
gr
at
io
n 
 
  
Ingredient 
branding 
× 
(No) √ √ √ × × 
• Tide with Downy fabric 
softener 
• Frito-Lay chips with KC 
Masterpiece BBQ sauce 
• Diet Coke with Splenda 
Component 
branding × × √ √ × × 
• Dell PC with Intel Xeon 
processor 
• Ford Explorer with 
Goodyear tires 
• Clark Gable and Vivien 
Leigh in Gone with the Wind  
Brand 
bundling × × × √ √ √ 
• iPod with Bose sound system 
• Bacardi Rum and Coke 
• McCain–Palin and Obama–
Biden presidential tickets 
Co-
promotion × × × × √ √ 
• McDonald’s with Disney 
toys 
• Hilton’s reward miles on 
American Airlines 
• BP gas stations’ cross-ruff 
coupon for tickets to 
Disney’s Wall-E 
Low Co-location × × × × × √ 
• Barnes & Noble with 
Starbucks 
• Toys R Us e-store at 
Amazon.com 
• KFC–Taco Bell–Pizza Hut 
freedom-of-choice outlets 
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We propose a hierarchy of six types of co-branding, from the most to the least integrated, 
which defines each type in terms of presence or absence of certain characteristics, including co-
creation of the co-branded offering, physical and/or functional separability, tie-in sales, discount 
for purchasing the partnering brand, and greater variety and/or reduced search: 
1. Co-development: The firms pool their resources to co-create the product, which, similar 
to a biological offspring, shares the parents’ traits in a fully blended fashion.  In form 
and function, it is practically impossible to separate the two brands (e.g., Amaldoss et 
al. 2000). 
2. Ingredient branding: Unlike co-development, the ingredient is developed separately by 
one brand manufacturer and has a stand-alone form.  However, in the co-branded 
product, the brands are physically and functionally inseparable (e.g., Desai and Keller 
2002).   
3. Component branding: Shares the characteristics of ingredient branding, except that the 
component is physically distinguishable and separable in the co-branded product.  If a 
defect can be traced to the component, it alone can be replaced to restore product 
functionality (e.g., Simonin and Ruth 1998; Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997). 
4. Brand bundling: As with component branding, the two brands are functionally 
compatible with and complementary to each other and are sold as a specially priced 
package.  However, unlike component branding, each brand has stand-alone value; that 
is, each can be purchased and consumed independently (e.g., Stremersch and Tellis 
2002). 
5. Co-promotion: Similar to brand bundling, the products have stand-alone value, and 
there is a monetary incentive to facilitate joint purchase.  However, unlike brand 
bundling, consumers are not forced to buy both brands; the brands need not be 
functionally compatible or complementary (e.g., Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986). 
6. Co-location: As with co-promotion, the two brands are self-standing, and purchasing 
both may provide more variety or reduce search costs.  Yet, unlike co-promotion, there 
is no monetary incentive to buy both brands (e.g., Iyer and Pazgal 2003). 
Table 1 includes examples for each of the six co-branding types.4  The managers we 
interviewed also reported examples of each co-branding integration level.   
Co-branding Exclusivity 
                                                 
4 We recognize that co-certification, as in J.D. Power’s top rating of cars, has some elements of co-branding.  However, the term does not fully 
meet our definition because both brands do not need to agree to this arrangement.  Rather, one brand can provide the certification without 
coordination with the other brand. 
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Co-branding exclusivity captures whether the focal brand has one or many partners for a 
similar type of co-branding arrangement.5  This dimension resonated with the interviewees in 
several ways and implied linkages to the mechanisms of attribution and categorization (which we 
discuss subsequently): 
• CRM Director of Grocery Chain: “In [state X] we are exclusive with [ABC] Bank 
whereas in [state Y] we have traditionally worked with seven different banks.  With 
exclusivity we have more control and can do more co-marketing.”  This interviewee also 
noted that less exclusive relationships in [state Y] allowed the chain to work with 
multiple customer segments. 
• VP (Sales) of major supplier to the steel industry: “We are very conscious of our 
reputation in the market. … We have gone exclusive with a partner who provides the 
service and support that we desire.” 
 
Co-branding Duration 
We define co-branding duration as the length of time the partners commit to pursuing a 
co-branding arrangement.  The relationship could be short-term (e.g., Disney’s Lion King co-
promotion with Burger King for that movie only) or long-term, encompassing multiple 
generations (e.g., Pixar’s partnership with Disney to co-produce multiple movies, finally leading 
to the merger of Pixar and Disney; generations of Dell PCs with Intel microprocessors) or long 
life cycles (e.g., Diet Coke with NutraSweet).  The duration of the relationship was pertinent to 
how the executives thought of co-branding: 
• Sales VP of a sports goods manufacturer: On a long-term relationship with the 
NBA…“Over time, 95% of the products we shipped were NBA licensed … We couldn’t 
take away the mark easily because our very brand name was associated with the NBA.”  
• Director of heritage brands at a B2C food manufacturer: Referring to how longstanding 
relationships have helped establish composite products … “Nearly half of Bacardi Rum 
is consumed with Coke.  Same with [a popular brand of whiskey] and Coke.”   
                                                 
5
 Although Voss and Gammoh (2004) consider the implications of having one versus two partners, their two-partner case involves having a 
single ally in each of two categories (e.g., Sony in personal digital assistants, Hewlett-Packard in printers).  In contrast, our co-branding 
exclusivity (more versus less) is in a single category (e.g., Intel microprocessors cobranded with multiple PC brands).   
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3.2    DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND UNDERLYING PROCESSES 
With our propositions, presented in the next section, we attempt to make the case that the type of 
co-branding arrangement a brand enters into has a bearing on its evaluation and/or accessibility 
in the co-branding context.  In the following subsections, we discuss these two outcome variables 
and the customers’ mental processes underlying these outcomes. 
Brand Evaluation 
Brand evaluation, or how favorably a brand is perceived by customers (Brunner and 
Wanke 2006; Gürhan-Canli 2003; Labroo and Lee 2006), is based on its performance and/or 
attribute-level impressions (e.g., nice taste versus high calorie content, as in the case of Godiva 
chocolate; Park, Jun, and Shocker. 1996).  In a co-branding context, brand evaluation can be 
affected when the characteristics of the partnering brand are perceived as fusing with, 
influencing, or rubbing onto the characteristics of the focal brand (Simonin and Ruth 1998).  
This spillover effect can be either positive or negative causing enhancement or dilution effects 
respectively (Keller and Aaker 1992; Loken and John 1993).  The executives we interviewed 
were clearly sensitive to the potential impact of co-branding on brand evaluation: 
• Sales VP at a consumer products firm: “Ford and Eddie Bauer did a good co-brand.  
Ford used Eddie Bauer on higher priced cars … a nice, upgraded line of vehicles … 
helped Eddie Bauer broaden their brand.”  
• Marketing Director of major PC brand: “We do a lot of storage business … Credibility is 
very important in our business …  If your system collapses then the data are gone.  The 
client has to trust you and put the data on your storage.  So [we have] aligned with EMC 
– a very credible and established storage company.” 
The process of attribution underlies how people assign credit or blame for the observed 
performance (Folkes 1988) or, equivalently, how they evaluate the partnering brands.  Customers 
may identify as the source of good or bad performance the focal brand alone, the partnering 
brand alone, the brands jointly, or neither brand (but some extraneous factor instead).  In 
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developing our propositions, we clarify that the nature of the co-branding arrangement (in terms 
of integration, exclusivity, and duration) has a bearing on customers’ likely attributions of 
performance, thus clarifying the impact on focal brand evaluation.   
The managers we interviewed were sensitive to customers’ attribution of performance 
and its implications for brand evaluation: 
• VP (Sales & Marketing) of paintball manufacturer: “One of the concerns we had co-
branding with the army is if the American public would see it as a negative on our brand.  
We did the research … the reality was nobody had negative feelings about the Army and 
soldiers … the negative feelings if any were toward the government.” 
• Commercial Manager at optic fiber manufacturer: “We are selective in partnering 
because if something goes wrong, we would be hurt.  We need to be very careful taking a 
risk on someone else’s brand.  We do the risk assessment first and then look at the pros 
and cons of co-branding with the firm.” 
The three dimensions of attribution—locus, stability, and control—are central to inferring 
how customers will evaluate the brands (Klein and Dawar 2004).  Locus represents whether the 
cause (of good or poor performance) is viewed as internal or external to the perceived source 
(Teas and McElroy 1986).  Stability focuses on the constancy of the cause tied to the outcome 
(Russell 1982).  Controllability (or control) refers to whether a particular brand is (or was) in a 
position to drive or avoid the performance outcome (Weiner 2000).  Locus and controllability 
may often point to the same brand (e.g., when the locus is within McDonald’s, it should be able 
control the quality of its burgers).   
The extant literature (e.g., Johnston and Kim 1994; Teas and McElroy 1986; Weiner 
2000) guides how these dimensions of attribution link with evaluation.  For example, a brand’s 
strong (or weak) performance across co-branding situations is likely to point to an internal locus: 
As an illustration, if AT&T’s wireless plans work well independent of the partnering handset 
brands, the cause is more likely to be internal to AT&T, and its evaluation is likely to be more 
favorable.  Attributions that point to a locus internal to a brand should influence that brand’s 
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evaluation more than external attributions.  Furthermore, attributions based on information over 
time should influence brand evaluation more than snapshot evidence about a brand.   
Brand Accessibility 
Brand accessibility represents the retrievability of a brand from memory (Holden and 
Lutz 1992).  Though internally generated, accessibility can be influenced by external cues that 
activate specific information in memory (Nedungadi 1990) and “bring to mind” associated ideas 
and events (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991).  The accessibility of a brand is distinct from 
how a customer might evaluate a brand.  For example, Nedungadi (1990) argues that while 
changes in a brand’s value influence its evaluation, accessibility does not need to be value driven 
(see also Berger and Mitchell 1989).   
Our focus on brand accessibility as a dependent variable is motivated in part by related 
work in the brand extension literature.  Morrin (1999, p. 523) shows that the extension affects the 
accessibility of the parent brand, especially when the parent brand is not strong or when the 
extension has a natural fit with the parent category.  Meyvis and Janiszewski (2004) suggest that 
accessibility of the parent brand can positively affect that of the brand extension.  Our interviews 
with managers suggest parallel implications in a co-branding context.  Suggesting that its co-
branding partner could affect the focal brand’s accessibility, a customer relationship management 
director at a grocery chain stated:  
• “I used to think of Sears as appliances and tools … however, I have reconsidered Sears 
for casual clothing because I really like the Lands’ End brand.  It is the only retail outlet 
where I can buy the clothing without having to order it off the catalog.” 
 
The process of categorization is fundamental to brand accessibility (Cohen and Basu 
1987).  Categorization is the process of organizing objects, including brands, into category 
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structures (Lajos et al. 2009) and drawing on these representations while encountering new 
products, marketing stimuli, and/or consumption situations (Loken, Barsalou, and Joiner 2007; 
Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991).  The work of Tulving and Thomson (1973) on memory 
encoding and retrieval suggests that in a co-branding context the accessibility of one brand is 
likely to increase the accessibility of its partner, while preempting that of a third brand unrelated 
to the first (see also Van Osselaer and Alba 2003).   
Broadly, categorization and its link to brand accessibility are contingent on at least three 
elements.  First, the “strength of association” between objects helps determine how these are 
eventually retrieved (Jain, Desai, and Mao 2007).  In our context, a higher degree of co-branding 
integration and longer co-branding duration enable a stronger association between partner 
brands, enhancing accessibility.  Second, the “incidence” or frequency of association between 
objects affects whether the objects are in one category structure and how cuing one aids the 
accessibility of the associated brand (see Morrin 1999).  The co-branding exclusivity dimension 
is tied to the incidence of association, with lower exclusivity pointing to multiple bonds that 
would facilitate brand accessibility.  Third, the “fit” as observed in the nature of symmetry 
between partners can influence the strength of association and related inferences (Kumar 2005; 
Park, Jun, and Shocker 1996).   
3.3     PROPOSITIONS DEVELOPMENT 
We will first present two propositions on the main effects of the co-branding arrangement on the 
focal brand’s evaluation and accessibility.  We then introduce three moderator variables that 
characterize the partnering brand (in relation to the focal brand), and present six related 
propositions.  Each proposition is to be seen on ceteris paribus basis.  Collectively, these help 
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address which co-branding arrangement and type of partner a focal brand should pursue.  Figure 
1 provides a parsimonious representation of our conceptual model. 
 
FIGURE 5:  A Parsimonious Representation of the Conceptual Framework 
 
3.3.1    Main Effects of Co-branding Integration, Exclusivity, and Duration 
Effect on focal brand evaluation. The focal brand entering a co-branding arrangement has a 
certain baseline (i.e., prior) evaluation.  Our dependent variable is the extent to which a particular 
co-branding arrangement shifts the evaluation of the focal brand from this baseline.  Without loss 
of generality, the baseline evaluation can be set to zero. 
Consider co-branding integration.  Lower integration is when the brands are more 
separated in form and function as, say, in co-location.  The performance (and realized value) of 
each brand is closer to what the brand might offer in its standalone or baseline condition.  With 
higher integration, the brands become more interdependent, and the observed performance is 
increasingly the joint performance of the partnering brands. Therefore, the higher the integration, 
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the more difficult it is to attribute the source of good (or bad) performance to just one brand 
(Greenwald 2001).  Because of the difficulty in identifying the locus of performance when the 
brands are more highly integrated, both brands are more likely to share the credit (or blame) in 
the event of good (or poor) performance (see Teas and McElroy 1986).  Thus, higher integration 
is likely to cause a greater shift in how the focal brand is evaluated vis-à-vis its baseline level.  
Thus: 
P1a:  The higher the co-branding integration, the greater its impact (positive or negative) on 
the evaluation of the focal brand.6 
Turning to co-branding exclusivity, consider a focal brand that co-brands with a single 
partner (high exclusivity) rather than with multiple partners (low exclusivity).  Under high 
exclusivity, the information about this single co-branding arrangement represents all the 
information relevant to make attributions.  Because no other (outside) brands can be credited or 
blamed in this case, attributions are likely to be internal to the focal brand (and its partner), and 
the impact (positive or negative) on the focal brand’s evaluation is likely to be greater.  In 
contrast, if a customer is aware that a focal brand has multiple partners (e.g., Ford Explorer with 
multiple brands of tires), poor (or good) performance of one co-branding arrangement (e.g., Ford 
with Firestone) represents partial information only (Johnston and Kim 1994; McArthur 1972).  
Attributions internal to the focal brand are unlikely to be as strong in a low exclusivity condition 
compared to an exclusive arrangement unless the good (or poor) performance extends across the 
multiple co-branded offerings.  Thus, the impact of co-branding on focal brand evaluation is 
likely to be weaker when a focal brand pursues a less exclusive arrangement. 
                                                 
6 In our propositions, we provide the possibility of a negative impact for completeness.  It is self-evident that if a firm expects co-branding with a 
particular partner to have a negative outcome, it will avoid the partnership unless there are mitigating circumstances. 
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While the main effect of exclusivity is easy to see under the high integration condition, it 
also applies under low integration.  To illustrate, consider a setting in which a focal retailer co-
locates with only one partner retailer across stores (e.g., Barnes & Noble with Starbucks Coffee).  
Suppose the partnering retailer is faced with an ethical or product quality controversy, consumers 
are more likely to call into question the focal retailer’s co-location decision under high 
exclusivity than if the focal retailer had multiple, retail partners.  Reinforcing this point in the 
low integration context of celebrity endorsements, it has been shown that negative (or positive) 
information about a celebrity has a greater impact on customer evaluation of the endorsed brand 
(Amos, Holmes, and Strutton 2008), and the impact of any one particular endorser is limited 
when other endorsers are also present (see Mowen and Brown 1981).  Thus: 
P1b:  The greater the co-branding exclusivity, the greater its impact (positive or negative) on 
the evaluation of the focal brand. 
On the impact of co-branding duration, stable attributions depend on information (or 
expectation) of performance over an extended period (see Folkes 1984).  A short co-branding 
relationship does not provide customers with the information needed to assess the consistency 
(over time) of good or poor performance.  Therefore, unstable attributions to the focal brand are 
more likely to be made (Lane 2000).  In this case, the impact on brand evaluation is not as strong 
as that in long-term relationships, which enable consumers to make more stable attributions 
(Weiner 2000, p. 384).   
We note that making stable attributions does not require the performance itself to be 
stable over time.  Stability in attribution focuses on the constancy of the cause tied to the 
outcome (Russell 1982).  As a yardstick for assessing stability, Weiner (1985, p. 557 and p. 559) 
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invokes the requirement of greater certainty in predicting future events tied to the cause (see also 
Folkes 1988, p. 551).  Thus, an increasing (or even a declining) path in the outcome variable can 
lead to stable attribution of the cause because the future outcome is consistent with expectation.  
And if these drivers continue to be present, the expectation would be that the growth will 
continue.  Thus: 
P1c:  The longer the co-branding duration, the greater its impact (positive or negative) on the 
evaluation of the focal brand. 
Effect on focal brand accessibility.  A high degree of co-branding integration suggests 
greater co-dependence in function and form between the partnering brands, thereby reinforcing 
the association between them.  This stronger bond implies that the brands are likely to be co-
categorized (Johnson and Lehman 1997), and so an exposure or cue of the partner brand is likely 
to enhance retrieval of the focal brand (Nedungadi 1990, p. 264).  Thus, accessibility of the focal 
brand is likely to be greater under higher levels of integration.  On the other hand, in a low 
integration co-branding arrangement, the use or performance of one brand is less related to the 
other brand, and , the bond between the brands is weak.  Thus: 
P2a:  The higher the co-branding integration, the greater the accessibility of the focal 
brand. 
With regard to co-branding exclusivity, when a brand forms multiple relationships, 
customers are likely to categorize and thereby access the focal brand in multiple ways.  The 
categorization literature suggests that when customers categorize a brand under multiple 
headings, they may recall or access it when encountering or remembering any of the associated 
objects or brands (Keller 2003; Morrin 1999).  Therefore, a customer’s exposure to or recall of 
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any of the partnering brands is likely to facilitate the accessibility of the focal brand (see also 
Nedungadi 1990).  Conversely, a more exclusive co-branding arrangement restricts the 
categorization structure, thus reducing accessibility of the focal brand.  Therefore: 
P2b:  The lower the co-branding exclusivity, the greater the accessibility of the focal 
brand. 
With regard to co-branding duration, a longer-term arrangement results in repeated 
exposure of the partnering brands, strengthening the link between the brands in the customers’ 
categorization structure (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991; Loken, Barsalou, and Joiner 2007).  
Cuing or remembering any partnering brand increases the likelihood of recall and accessibility of 
the focal brand.  However, when the co-branding relationship is short-term, the bond between the 
brands in the categorization structure is not as well established, lowering accessibility.  Thus: 
P2c:  The longer the co-branding duration, the greater the accessibility of the focal 
brand. 
P1 and P2 examine the direct effects of co-branding integration, exclusivity, and duration 
on focal brand evaluation and accessibility.  We next examine moderating factors that add more 
nuanced implications and, more importantly, guide the choice of appropriate partners. 
Partner Characteristics 
The characteristics of the partnering brand relative to the focal brand are likely to 
moderate the direct effects of a co-branding arrangement.  From our review of the literature and 
discussions with managers, we identified three key variables: functional symmetry (Park, Jun, 
and Shocker 1996), hedonic symmetry (Helmig, Huber, and Leeflang 2008), and brand breadth 
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(Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004).  We first define and motivate our choice of these variables and 
then present related propositions.7 
Functional symmetry. Functional (or utilitarian) attributes, such as printing speed or the 
ability to fight cavities, pertain to how a product or component performs or how convenient or 
practical it is to use (Chitturi, Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000).   
The (prospective) partnering brand and the focal brand could be symmetric (i.e., similar) on the 
functional attributes or asymmetric, in which one brand is weak on the attributes on which its 
partner is strong.  (Symmetry and asymmetry represent anchors of a continuum.)  One of our 
interviewees observed the following on functional asymmetry:  
• “Pillsbury and Nestle is a strong combination – each is strong in its domain of 
expertise.”  (Product planner at a business-to-business firm) 
 
Hedonic symmetry.  Hedonic attributes, such as luxury (e.g., Gucci) and glamour (e.g., 
Revlon), capture the sensory or emotional feelings evoked by the partnering brand (Aaker 1997; 
Hirschman and Holbrook 1982).  Partnering brands can be symmetric or asymmetric on the 
underlying hedonic elements.  Two brands are hedonically more symmetric when they convey 
similar sensory feelings, such as luxury, whereas they are more asymmetric when they convey 
inconsistent or dissimilar images (see Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Völckner and Sattler 2006).  
Relating this variable to a co-branding context, two of our interviewees noted: 
• “It is very important for us to have a partner with the same image as ours… American, 
squeaky clean, non-political, non-religious ... we have to share similar attributes.  
Picking a partner is much more important when we launch a product together than it is 
when we do a short-term fundraiser.” (Ex-marketing manager for a national non-profit) 
                                                 
7 While we have not considered an aggregate, brand level construct such as relative brand equity, we look at customer perceptions at the attribute 
level, namely, symmetry between the brands on hedonic attributes and functional attributes.  Prior studies (e.g., Batra and Ahtola 1991; Voss, 
Spangenburg, and Grohmann 2003) have noted that the hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of an offering are distinct, and both can be relevant in 
consumer decision making. 
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• “Jaguar and Ford didn’t work because their images were not congruent; Jaguar didn’t 
seem luxurious anymore.” (Product planner at a business-to-business firm) 
 
Brand breadth.  Brand breadth refers to the diversity of product categories with which a 
brand is associated (Boush and Loken 1991; Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004).  For example, the 
Harley-Davidson brand is narrow in its breadth, because it focuses on “muscular” motorcycles.  
In contrast, the General Electric brand has far greater breadth, because its offerings span a wide 
assortment of product and service categories.  A brand manager for a fast-food chain we 
interviewed noted the following on brand breadth: 
• “Co-branding with a broad brand [diverse portfolio] is a viable unit growth strategy 
especially in quick service restaurants as unit development is a meaningful way to gain 
the added market penetration.” 
3.3.2     Moderating Effects of Partner Characteristics on Focal Brand Evaluation 
To recall P1, co-branding has greater impact (positive or negative) on focal brand evaluation 
under higher integration, greater exclusivity, and longer duration.  The central argument pertains 
to the higher likelihood of stable, internal attributions when co-branding is highly integrated, 
exclusive, and long-term.  We now discuss how the characteristics of the partner brand might 
amplify or temper customers’ attributions and the related impact on focal brand evaluation. 
Functional symmetry. Functional asymmetry in co-branding can alleviate customers’ 
concerns with a brand that is relatively weak on a functional attribute (Park, Jun, and Shocker 
1996).  In a traditional economic sense (see Cheng and Nahm 2010), an extreme analogy of 
functional asymmetry would be of the left and right shoes that perform better jointly than two 
left shoes.  We posit that the positive influence of functional asymmetry varies according to the 
nature of the co-branding arrangement. 
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P1a implies that the evaluation of the focal brand (relative to its baseline level before co-
branding), is prone to greater impact when it is more highly integrated with its partner.  Here 
customers see a shared locus between the brands.  Improving joint performance is more critical.  
Thus, under high integration, functional asymmetry can help achieve significant superior joint 
performance (relative to that under functional symmetry) and make internal attribution more 
favorable.   
Functional asymmetry can bring added benefits under lower levels of integration as well 
(e.g., co-location of Taco Bell and KFC offers variety and balance; see Oxenfeldt 1966).  But 
because customers are less likely to apportion credit or blame due to the partner brand to the 
focal brand under low integration, the moderating role of functional asymmetry is weaker in this 
condition.  Thus: 
P3a:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact (and weaker the negative impact) of co-branding integration on 
evaluation of the focal brand. 
The exclusivity—evaluation main effect in P1b is based on the greater likelihood of 
internal attributions under greater exclusivity.  As the associated praise or blame on the focal 
brand is likely to be higher under greater exclusivity, it is more critical for the focal brand to 
ensure that its partner(s) can compensate for its shortcomings and help provide superior overall 
performance.  By improving the combined performance of the brands, functional asymmetry is 
likely to make internal attributions more favorable (or conversely make unfavorable attributions 
less unfavorable), thereby strengthening the positive impact (or weakening the negative impact) 
of exclusivity on focal brand evaluation.  In contrast, functional asymmetry under low 
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exclusivity is likely to be less effective.  The availability of many options, each with a somewhat 
different case of functional asymmetry (e.g., Diet Coke with brands of aspartame, sucralose, and 
neotame), may confuse customers (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), and so positive attribution internal 
to the focal brand is likely to be weaker.  Thus: 
P3b:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact (and weaker the negative impact) of co-branding exclusivity on 
evaluation of the focal brand. 
The co-branding duration—evaluation main effect in P1c is based on the argument that 
stable attributions are more likely when the duration is greater, and so greater is the impact 
(positive or negative) of duration on focal brand evaluation.  To make the stable attributions 
more positive (or less negative), it is vital to have a functionally asymmetric partner that can 
compensate for the focal brand’s shortcomings and deliver better overall performance.  On the 
other hand, functional asymmetry is less critical (albeit still desirable) in shorter relationships, 
with less stable attributions.  Thus:  
P3c:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact (and weaker the negative impact) of co-branding duration on evaluation 
of the focal brand. 
Hedonic symmetry.  Gwinner and Eaton (1999) show that hedonic symmetry or 
congruence between a sporting event and sponsor leads to more favorable outcomes and better 
image transfer than an asymmetric pairing.  Consistently, Meenaghan (1991) find that 
asymmetry slows favorable outcomes.  The work of Ellen, Moore and Webb (2002) and Kamins 
and Gupta (1994) underscore that hedonic symmetry between a product and endorser leads to 
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greater believability of the message and a more favorable view of the product.  While there is 
some evidence (e.g., Hastie 1988) to suggest that hedonic asymmetry might cause greater 
elaboration, this latter stream also finds that enhanced information processing by customers 
under hedonic asymmetry eventually leads to greater skepticism about the pairing (see Lee and 
Hyman 2008; Rifon et al. 2004).  Thus, the evidence strongly supports a favorable effect of 
hedonic symmetry on brand evaluation, although the strength of this effect depends on the type 
of co-branding arrangement. 
Under high co-branding integration (P1a), we argued that the brands’ intertwined form 
and function are likely to make customers see a shared locus between the partnering brands, 
strongly impacting focal brand evaluation (relative to its pre-co-branding level), thus making it 
especially important (relative to the low integration condition) for the brands to fit well.  
Teaming up with a hedonically asymmetric brand under high integration is likely to invite 
skepticism which would turn to unfavorable attributions for the focal brand in the event of weak 
or equivocal performance (see Rifon et al. 2004).  That is, hedonic symmetry is likely to make 
the positive integration—evaluation link in P1a stronger (or make a negative link less negative).  
By contrast, in the case of low co-branding integration, consumers can more easily disentangle 
the benefits from either brand, and thus hedonic symmetry should impact the integration—
evaluation link less severely.  Thus: 
P4a:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact (and weaker the negative impact) of co-branding integration on focal 
brand evaluation. 
The co-branding exclusivity—evaluation link in P1b is based on the greater likelihood of 
attributions internal to the brands under greater exclusivity.  To insure that these attributions are 
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more favorable (or less unfavorable), the focal brand is better off avoiding a hedonically 
asymmetric partner that would make customers confused and skeptical about the meaning of the 
pairing (see Broniarczyk and Alba 1994).  On the other hand, when the relationship is less 
exclusive, the focal brand is less vulnerable to the outcome of any single co-branding 
relationship.  Ensuring that a partner is hedonically symmetric becomes less critical in this 
setting.  Thus: 
P4b:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger is the 
positive impact (and weaker is the negative impact) of co-branding exclusivity on focal 
brand evaluation. 
In P1c, the co-branding duration—evaluation link was based on the greater likelihood of 
stable attribution when the arrangement is of a longer duration.  To nudge the stable attribution 
in a more favorable direction, it is desirable to align with a hedonically symmetric brand so as to 
reassure customers of a harmonious pairing.  The downside of a hedonically asymmetric pairing 
is less severe in a shorter co-branding arrangement.  Unstable attributions are more likely, and 
any customer skepticism is quickly overcome when the arrangement is ended.  Thus: 
P4c:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger is the 
positive impact (and weaker is the negative impact) of co-branding duration on focal 
brand evaluation. 
Brand breadth.  Although brands with greater breadth have more benefit associations 
than narrow brands (Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004), excessive breadth can dilute a brand’s image 
(Keller and Aaker 1992; Loken and John 1993).  A narrow brand has a more distinct image 
(Sheinin and Schmitt 1994) and so customers can more easily gauge what the brand does or does 
not bring to the co-branded offering.  
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According to P1a, under higher integration the co-brands closely share a locus of 
performance.  A partnering brand with less breadth (i.e., a more focused image) is likely to 
magnify the match (or mismatch) of the co-brands.    Under co-branding, aligning with a narrow 
brand could significantly enhance the evaluation of the focal brand or underscore the 
incongruity, resulting in an unfavorable attribution that significantly lowers focal brand 
evaluation.  Conversely, brands with greater breadth are better able to withstand the threat of 
brand dilution when forming new extensions (Nijssen and Agustin 2005).  This suggests that 
partnering with a brand with greater breadth tempers the downside of negative evaluation while 
softening the upside potential for the focal brand.  Under lower integration, on the other hand, 
brand breadth is less significant because the locus is separated and attributions are less 
influenced by the nature of the partner.  Thus: 
P5a:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brand, the weaker the impact (positive or 
negative) of co-branding integration on evaluation of the focal brand. 
In P1b, the link between co-branding exclusivity and focal brand evaluation is premised 
on stronger internal attribution in the case of high exclusivity.  Greater breadth of the partner 
brand(s) would diffuse the meaning of what the co-branding represents (see Meyvis and 
Janiszewski 2004 on brand extensions) and is likely to make the internal attributions less 
favorable.  By contrast, a partner with a tight (or narrow) focus (in the same high exclusivity 
condition) would make it clear to the customers what the co-branding represents, even if that 
message of clarity is one of incongruity (Sheinin and Schmitt 1994).  As a result, the internal 
attribution under narrow breadth of the partner would be stronger (or loosely, more extreme) 
under greater exclusivity, and strengthen the exclusivity—evaluation link.  Under low 
exclusivity, the significance of each partnership is diffused to begin with due to the multiplicity 
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of partners.  While partners with less breadth still give clarity to the co-branding partnerships, the 
effect is likely to be not as strong as in the high exclusivity condition.  Thus: 
P5b:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brand, the weaker the impact (positive or 
negative) of co-branding exclusivity on evaluation of the focal brand. 
The posited co-branding duration—evaluation link in P1c is based on the greater 
likelihood of stable attribution for longer relationships.  When the partner has greater breadth and 
correspondingly a more diffused image (Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004), the stable attribution is 
likely to be weakened.  Therefore, the impact of longer duration on focal brand evaluation is 
likely to be weaker than when the partner brand has a narrow breadth.  On the other hand, shorter 
co-branding arrangements are primed for less stable attribution, with lower impact on focal brand 
evaluation.  Thus, while consumers’ attributions will be clearer when the partner brand has less 
breadth, the role of breadth is muted due to shorter co-branding duration.  Thus: 
P5c:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brand, the weaker the impact (positive or 
negative) of co-branding duration on evaluation of the focal brand. 
3.3.3     Moderating Effects of Partner Characteristics on Focal Brand Accessibility 
P2 posits that greater co-branding integration and duration, but lower exclusivity, lead to greater 
focal brand accessibility.  We now discuss how the partner brand’s characteristics moderate these 
effects on focal brand accessibility. 
Functional symmetry.  In P1a, the co-branding integration—accessibility link is based on 
stronger bonds between the brands under higher integration owing to their co-dependence in 
form and function, which facilitates co-categorization and retrieval.  Greater asymmetry among 
the functional attributes, in which a brand’s functional strength on an attribute overcomes the 
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partner’s lack of strength on the same attribute, points to additional complementarity at both the 
category and the brand level (Park, Jun, and Shocker 1996).  In a co-advertising context, such 
functional asymmetry is shown to lead to greater awareness of the brands (Samu, Krishnan, and 
Smith 1999).  The related cognitive assessment of fit is likely to facilitate better retrieval of the 
focal brand under higher integration (see Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989).  By contrast, 
accessibility under lower integration is not likely to benefit as much by functional asymmetry of 
the brands because of the weaker interdependence in form and function.  Thus:   
P6a:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact of co-branding integration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
P2b points to greater accessibility of the focal brand when it has multiple partners.  There 
are simply more linkages between the focal brand and its co-categorized partners in this case, 
increasing the number of ways in which the focal brand is cued or retrieved. In a brand extension 
context, Aaker and Keller (1990) show that complementarity between the parent and extension 
brands facilitates the associations customers make.  The complementarity arising from functional 
asymmetry thus strengthens the multiple bonds in the categorization structure under the low 
exclusivity condition, augmenting accessibility.  While functional asymmetry strengthens the 
bond(s) in the high exclusivity condition as well, there are fewer bonds, reducing the boost to 
accessibility when there are few partners.  In sum, the negative relationship between exclusivity 
and focal brand accessibility is likely to be strengthened under functional asymmetry. Thus:  
P6b:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
negative impact of co-branding exclusivity on accessibility of the focal brand. 
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The positive link between co-branding duration and accessibility in P2c is based on 
stronger bond(s) between the brands due to repeated exposure in a longer relationship.  
Extending the arguments tied to P6b above (e.g., Aaker and Keller 1990), the repeated exposure 
is augmented by the meaningfulness of the exposure due to the complementary nature of the 
brands under high functional asymmetry, enhancing retrieval and focal brand accessibility (see 
also Samu, Krishnan, and Smith 1999).  By contrast, in a shorter relationship the bond is weaker, 
reducing the leverage from functional asymmetry.  Thus: 
P6c:  The more asymmetric the partnering brands on functional attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact of co-branding duration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
Hedonic symmetry.  The case for P2a on the co-branding integration—accessibility link is 
based on the stronger bond between the brands when they are closer in form and function under 
high integration.  But because hedonic asymmetry underscores the discord at the level of image 
or feeling, customers are prone to feel skeptical about the brand partners if there is hedonic 
asymmetry, which leads to discord at an emotional level (Rifon et al.  2004).  This, in turn, 
should have an adverse effect on encoding and retrieval, and weaken the accessibility advantage 
arising out of high integration (see also Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991).  Under low 
integration, the disjointedness of the brands in form and function limits the ability of hedonic 
symmetry to strengthen the bond, and the leverage on focal brand accessibility is weaker.  Thus:   
P7a:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact of co-branding integration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
The negative impact of co-branding exclusivity on accessibility in P2b is tied to the 
limited number of bonds leading to the focal brand in the high exclusivity condition.  With many 
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partners (low co-branding exclusivity), the multiplicity of ways in which the focal brand can be 
categorized, cued and retrieved is likely to increase its accessibility.  Hedonic symmetry within 
these multiple partnerships, which conveys the message of believability and concordance, should 
strengthen the multiple bonds and facilitate retrieval (see Rifon et al. 2004).  Hedonic symmetry 
also strengthens the fewer bonds in the high exclusivity condition, improving accessibility, but 
with fewer partners, the leverage from hedonic symmetry is not as much.  Therefore, hedonic 
symmetry is likely to strengthen the negative relationship between exclusivity and focal brand 
accessibility.  Thus: 
P7b:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger the 
negative impact of co-branding exclusivity on accessibility of the focal brand. 
In P2c, longer co-branding duration is posited to lead to higher accessibility by increasing 
familiarity with, and connectedness among, the partnering brands, facilitating their co-
categorization and eventual retrieval (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991).  Hedonic symmetry 
can strengthen this link in two ways.  First, it makes the co-branding more believable, thereby 
facilitating encoding and retrieval.  Second, hedonically symmetric brands are inherently more 
likely to be co-categorized (e.g., Bentley cars and Naim car audio for top end riding experience) 
(see Ozanne, Brucks, and Grewal 1992), and if they partner over a longer time the encoding and 
accessibility are likely to get stronger.  This boost from hedonic symmetry will have limited 
impact if the arrangement is only for a short duration.  Thus: 
P7c:  The more symmetric the partnering brands on hedonic attributes, the stronger the 
positive impact of co-branding duration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
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Brand breadth.  In P2a, recall the argument based on a stronger bond between the brands 
under higher integration and its favorable impact on accessibility.  When the partner brand has 
greater breadth, the number of associations tied to the focal brand also increases (Joiner 2006), 
thereby offering more ways in which focal brand could be cued and retrieved (Meyvis and 
Janiszewski 2004).  In contrast, a narrow partner brand may provide the customer with a clearer 
understanding of what the association represents, but does not increase the number of linkages.  
Stated differently, greater breadth coupled with higher integration combines more effectively the 
strength and multiplicity of linkages, compounding the effect on accessibility.  While the 
multiple associations under greater breadth with also improve accessibility under low integration, 
the core bond is weak to begin with and the impact will therefore be smaller.  Thus: 
P8a:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brand, the stronger the positive impact of co-
branding integration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
The negative link between co-branding exclusivity and accessibility in P2b is predicated 
on fewer bonds (under high exclusivity) to aid the process of cuing, encoding and retrieval.  With 
multiple partners, there are more bonds to begin with.  All else being the same, a brand with 
greater breadth has more associations (Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004; Morrin 1999).  Thus, if the 
multiple partner brands also have greater breadth, the number of associations will multiply and 
further enhance cuing and retrieval, enhancing accessibility.  The benefit of increased 
accessibility from the broader partner brand(s) will also accrue under high exclusivity.  However, 
because of fewer bonds to begin with under the high exclusivity condition, the boost in 
accessibility is not likely to be as much.  Taken together, the negative relationship between 
exclusivity and focal brand accessibility should become more negative under greater breadth of 
the partnering brands.  Thus: 
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P8b:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brands, the stronger the negative impact of co-
branding exclusivity on accessibility of the focal brand. 
Turning to P2c on the co-branding duration—accessibility link, recall that the argument 
was tied to a stronger bond between the partners when their association is long-term.  The 
strength of association is complemented by the number of associations when partnering a brand 
with greater breadth.  The repeated exposure under greater duration means the multiple linkages 
become more familiar to customers, in turn facilitating accessibility through better encoding and 
retrieval (Nedungadi 1990).  The positive boost to accessibility under a partner’s greater breadth 
is not likely to be as high when the co-branding duration is short.  There is limited time for the 
customers to grasp and internalize the existence of the multiple linkages, thus weakening the 
positive boost to accessibility.  Thus: 
P8c:  The greater the breadth of the partnering brand, the stronger the positive impact of co-
branding duration on accessibility of the focal brand. 
With the above propositions in place, we will now step back to discuss the meaning and 
significance of the posited relationships for managers. 
 
3.4  MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Our compilation of co-branding examples and our interviews with managers underline the sheer 
volume and variety of co-branding partnerships in practice.  Our conceptual framework and the 
propositions posit the impact on a focal brand’s evaluation and accessibility by customers in the 
event that the brand enters into a co-branding arrangement, based on the dimensions of the 
arrangement (integration, exclusivity, and duration) and the characteristics of the prospective 
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partner (symmetry between brands on functional and hedonic attributes, and partner brand 
breadth). 
In this section, we articulate more explicitly the managerial implications of our 
conceptualization and normative propositions for decisions involving the choice of an 
appropriate co-branding arrangement and partner.  Specifically, we focus our discussion on three 
issues: (a) relating our conceptual framework to the co-branding decision-making process, 
including mapping dependent variables from our conceptual model onto managerial objectives; 
(b) elaborating on the implications of the propositions by recognizing that real world managerial 
decision-making must consider uncertainty in outcomes and tradeoffs between objectives; and 
(c) addressing issues of implementation of co-branding arrangements with partnering brands. 
The Co-branding Decision Making Process 
Co-branding objectives. While managers can relate intuitively to our two dependent 
variables, evaluation and accessibility of the focal brand, we note that these two variables map 
onto the strategic objectives defined in terms of product- (or, in our case, brand-) and market-
related goals (Amaldoss and Rapoport 2005; Ansoff 1957).  Improvement in brand evaluation is 
related to brand development, while an expansion of brand accessibility leads to greater 
consideration, contributing to market development.  Brand development implies greater brand 
value, which firms can leverage to command higher prices and/or secure greater share of the 
current target market.  Greater brand accessibility implies that customers in the focal or partner 
brand’s current market are more likely to retrieve the focal brand. This allows for market 
expansion by enlarging the potential size and/or penetration of the target market without 
necessarily influencing brand evaluation.  These strategic objectives are apparent in statements 
made by managers in our study: 
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• “Forming partnerships helped us maintain a premium priced product.” (fiber optics) 
• “We bundle solutions to provide greater value to the customer … greater than the sum of 
the parts.” (health care information technology) 
• “The biggest value is to expand the market.” (activated carbon-based treatment systems) 
• “We wanted to bring in our current nonusers.” (ready-to-eat cold cereal) 
• “We co-branded with a vendor of injection equipment … because it clearly adds value to 
the customer.  It also opens up opportunities in areas where we don’t do business in.” 
(specialty chemicals for the steel industry). 
The last quote illustrates the case of the manager seeking both brand development and 
market development objectives, a strategy that Ansoff (1957) labels as diversification, which 
involves improving brand evaluation and increasing brand accessibility simultaneously.  Thus, in 
practice, the co-branding decision may often involve prioritizing or trading off between the 
brand- and market-development objectives, with implications as discussed below. 
Co-branding arrangements and partners.  Our conceptualization focuses on the choices 
of co-branding arrangement and partner.  Designing a co-branding arrangement with a 
prospective partner involves three important structural components of the arrangement: its type, 
exclusivity, and duration.  In practice, the type—which our proposed hierarchy captures 
according to the level of integration; see Table 1—may be determined (or at least heavily 
influenced) by the specific co-branding opportunity under consideration.  For example, for 
Intel’s microprocessors, component branding would be the logical choice of the type of co-
branding arrangement.  In this sense, the level of integration may be viewed as the more 
fundamental decision, and the exclusivity and duration decisions may follow subsequently.  
While the latter decisions are separate from the arrangement type, they must be internally 
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consistent, and based on the nature and extent of commitment involved.8  Thus, managers must 
first be clear about the desired type of co-branding (in terms of the level of integration). 
The characteristics of the partnering brand can strongly influence the impact of the 
chosen co-branding arrangement on the ultimate outcome.  Analyzing the fit between the focal 
brand and a prospective partner requires that both brands be evaluated and compared separately 
on dimensions of functional performance and emotional appeal.  We discuss these issues from an 
implementation perspective subsequently.  The prospective partnering brand’s breadth is another 
key consideration, with the correct decision depending on the co-branding objectives, as seen 
below. 
The Propositions as a Guide to Making Co-branding Decisions 
Before examining the implications of specific propositions, we note the following: 
• P1 posits the strength, but not the direction, of impact of the co-branding arrangement 
variables on focal brand evaluation.  Thus, higher integration, greater exclusivity, and 
longer duration of the arrangement can each help boost evaluation if the impact turns out 
to be positive, but hurt in case the impact turns out to be negative.  To the extent that the 
outcome cannot be predicted with certainty at the time the co-branding decision is made, 
risk must be factored in to the decision, even if the expected impact on brand evaluation 
is positive.  This applies to P3-P5 as well, since they extend P1 by including the 
moderating effects of partner characteristics on the co-branding arrangement – focal 
brand evaluation relationship. 
• Greater exclusivity of the co-branding arrangement strengthens the impact on focal brand 
evaluation but weakens the impact on focal brand accessibility (P1b and P2b).  Likewise, 
                                                 
8 A number of real world examples underscore that greater integration by itself does not require an exclusive co-branding arrangement.  
Under high integration, while iPhone with AT&T wireless plan (until recently) and Rolls Royce Trent engines in Airbus A380 aircraft are 
examples of exclusivity, we also find less exclusive arrangements as in BlackBerry customized for Verizon, Sprint and others, and 
NutraSweet in a variety of diet soft drinks. 
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greater breadth of the partnering brand weakens the impact of the co-branding 
arrangement variables on brand evaluation but strengthens the positive impact of 
integration and duration (and the negative impact of exclusivity) on brand accessibility.  
Thus, decisions made with regard to these variables will impact evaluation and 
accessibility in opposite ways, implying that managers must prioritize their co-branding 
objectives in order to make the best decision. 
Implications of the main effects of co-branding arrangement variables (P1 and P2).  Co-
branding arrangements with higher integration and longer duration require a greater commitment 
on the part of the focal brand, and exclusive arrangements can be risky because further options 
are limited.  P1 implies that such arrangements, if successful, are likely to have a stronger 
positive impact on the brand’s value.  However, if the partnership fails, the loss of brand value 
may be magnified.  Thus, such arrangements are likely to increase expected returns but with 
higher risk.  Greater due diligence is called for in structuring the arrangement and choosing the 
exclusive partner to minimize downside risk.  Managers with low tolerance for risk may, for 
example, choose to hedge their bets by choosing multiple partners, incorporating “escape” 
clauses in contracts so that unsuccessful partnerships can be terminated, and/or even starting with 
a less integrated arrangement to test the waters before stepping up the level of integration.  As a 
former marketing manager for a national non-profit organization noted, partners must be chosen 
more carefully in a product co-development arrangement than in a short-term co-promotion.  
Other managers reinforced the importance of careful risk assessment. 
Greater integration and longer duration support the goals of both brand and market 
development, albeit with possible risk to brand value if the relationship fails.  However, greater 
exclusivity, though recommended for brand development, is not the preferred option for market 
development (P2b).  Thus, if market development is the more important goal, multiple co-
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branding partners would be the way to go.  Even in this case, managers may choose to test the 
market with a single partner before scaling up to multiple partners, thereby reducing the risk of a 
possible dilution of brand value.  For example, as the marketing director of a major PC brand 
noted, “You have an exclusive relationship initially, that becomes more inclusive over time.”  
Another approach for dealing with the different implications of co-branding exclusivity for brand 
evaluation (P1b) and accessibility (P2b) would be to pursue greater exclusivity at one level (e.g., 
Northwest Airlines co-branding exclusively with KLM, until recently, arguably to improve 
evaluation through higher integration and functional asymmetry) and a less exclusive form at 
another level (e.g., Northwest offering affinity programs with multiple hotel chains to plausibly 
to increase accessibility or consideration). 
Implications of the moderating effects of partner characteristics (P3 – P8).The managerial 
implications of P3–P8 pertain to the partner selection decision—specifically, the brand 
characteristics that allow for a potentially successful partnership.  The managerial “bottom line” 
is clear: The brands should complement each other on their functional attributes but be congruent 
on the hedonic attributes (that drive the brand’s emotional appeal or image) to obtain the most 
favorable outcomes in terms of both brand evaluation and accessibility.  This ensures (a) a 
stronger, more positive, impact if the co-branding arrangement decision is successful in 
increasing brand value; (b) an ameliorating effect if the decision does not work out and threatens 
to decrease brand value; and (c) a positive reinforcement of market development. 
Operationally, this means that in evaluating prospective co-branding partners for 
potential fit, managers must identify how these brands are perceived on functional and hedonic 
attributes relative to their own (focal) brand.  When the partnering brands are strong on different 
functional attributes, there is the opportunity to enhance value by combining functional strengths.  
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In contrast, incompatibility on hedonic attributes is almost guaranteed to hurt brand value.  
Underlying this point is the product planning manager’s observation that Pillsbury and Nestlé 
form a strong combination because of strong domain expertise, while the partnership between 
Jaguar and Ford is not congruent.  As the latter case proves, even if there are compelling supply-
side reasons for a partnership, care should be taken not to present the two brand names together. 
Beem (2010) provides examples of successful co-branding partnerships that Cold Stone 
Creamery (of which he is president) has entered into that illustrate these ideas:  “…We have 
successfully combined our ‘Ultimate Ice Cream Experience’ with such complementary brands as 
Oreo, JELL-O Pudding, and Jelly Belly.  The combination of these premium brands and iconic 
flavors are a draw for our customers and a natural fit in quality and reputation.”  This is a case of 
ingredient branding involving brands with consistent hedonic attributes, with the objective of 
brand development.  Beem also provides examples of successful co-location initiatives involving 
Tom Horton’s and Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory in co-branded stores, leveraging 
complementary functional attributes in terms of the brands generating store traffic at different 
times of day (in the case of Tom Horton’s) and different seasons of the year (Rocky Mountain 
Chocolate Factory).  Both partnerships have increased store traffic and profitability, with the 
primary objective of market development. 
The breadth of the partnering brand (as measured by the number of distinct product 
categories) is an important consideration because it impacts brand evaluation and accessibility in 
opposite ways.  All else being equal, if brand development is the primary goal, managers should 
choose a narrow brand (focused on one or a few categories).  Conversely, a broad brand with a 
dispersed presence across several categories is helpful when managers’ goal is primarily market 
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development.  However, managers should assess the risk of brand dilution in the latter case 
before deciding on the partner(s). 
Implementation Issues 
Given the stakes involved, the first question on the co-branding checklist is: does co-
branding make sense at all?  A successful co-branding arrangement must add net value to both 
partners, after accounting for the costs of co-branding.  As a business development manager at a 
bearings manufacturer noted, “One plus one must equal three—if both companies cannot create 
more value by co-branding compared to going ahead alone, we will go ahead alone, because it is 
easier to manage.” 
Along with assessing the net benefit of co-branding, managers must identify the best co-
branding arrangement and the best partner(s) for that arrangement.  Indeed, the former 
assessment needs consideration of the latter factors.  In the context of co-branding as a brand 
transition strategy, Abratt and Motlana (2002) conclude that the implementation process should 
involve the following steps: (1) understand consumer brand perceptions, (2) consider product fit 
of both brands, (3) leverage company strengths of both brands, (4) consider the packaging of the 
co-brand, and (5) consider the timing of transition. 
Typically, the stakes are higher with more integrated and longer-term partnerships, in 
terms of potential benefits, costs, and risks.  In addition to greater diligence in conducting the 
cost–benefit analysis to evaluate both the possible arrangements and potential partners, firms 
should define guidelines that govern the co-branding arrangement between partners.  For 
example, 3M Corporation defines co-branding as “the use of one or more trademarks from two 
or more companies for the marketing of specific goods, services, and events” and provides clear 
standards for enhancing and protecting 3M and partner brands for the following co-branding 
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relationships: ingredient branding, joint ventures, joint marketing, licensed merchandise, and 
sponsorships (see http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_WW/Corp/Identity/Alliances/Co-
branding/).  In a nonprofit setting, United Way of Greater St. Louis specifies guidelines for 
member agencies to develop co-branding opportunities (http://www.stl.unitedway.org/co-
branding.aspx). 
Correct implementation is critical to ensuring that co-branding is a win–win strategy for 
both partners.  This requires a clear roadmap with specific guidelines to arrive at the right choice 
of co-branding arrangement and partner(s) and, ultimately, an unambiguous agreement (usually 
in the form of a formal contract) between the partners to ensure smooth execution. 
3.5    CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS 
Despite the pervasiveness of co-branding in the real world, academic research has barely 
scratched the surface.  Co-branding is a nuanced and multi-layered concept, yet extant articles 
have either treated it as a single, unified idea or have explored only particular subtypes.  On the 
practitioner side, our interviews suggest that even managers with firsthand co-branding 
experience have only partly recognized the strategic options within co-branding and the interplay 
between structural elements of co-branding and partner selection.  Against this backdrop, we 
have proposed a new categorization of co-branding types and offered a series of propositions on 
how and with whom a firm should co-brand.  Our preceding “Managerial Implications” section 
has elaborated on the meaning of our conceptualization and propositions for brand and market 
development. 
From a process standpoint, our study is arguably the first to apply the mechanism of 
attribution to clarify when or how co-branding might work.  Although attribution as a process is 
backward looking, because it involves making sense of events that have already occurred, we 
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argue that firms should make decisions by being forward looking and anticipating customers’ 
possible attributions under specific co-branding arrangements.  While prior research has drawn 
on categorization in the context of ingredient branding, we discuss its relevance in other co-
branding situations as well, and in turn the impact on brand accessibility. 
Most of the extant studies on co-branding are anchored almost entirely in the consumer 
behavior literature (e.g., Simonin and Ruth 1994) or in the marketing strategy literature (e.g., 
Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986).  Our study has integrated consumer behavior theories (e.g., 
categorization) and concepts (e.g., brand evaluation), attribution theory from social psychology, 
and brand management concepts such as brand accessibility and fit.  Doing so has yielded a 
series of propositions that, we hope, appeal directly to managers.   
Future Research Agenda 
Beyond its popularity, the topic of co-branding is rich and complex, and warrants 
additional research.  In proposing potential avenues for future work, we first discuss 
opportunities closest to the current study.   
While our approach is centered on how to pursue co-branding, we have not examined 
when and how a firm should withdraw from a co-branding situation.  Such occasions may arise 
when an important partner brand’s reputation is threatened (for ethical or quality reasons), when 
the partner ups its demands, or when the focal brand itself wants to reposition.  Our interviews 
with managers suggest that abandoning co-branding is not easy when the brands are strongly co-
categorized in customers’ minds.  While co-branding with multiple partners is one way to 
mitigate the fallout with a single partner, multiple relationships may make it even harder for the 
focal brand to disband co-branding.  This issue is both important and underexplored.  
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In exploring the main effects of co-branding integration, exclusivity and duration, we 
have not considered how these antecedents might have an interactive influence.  While higher 
integration and duration are both posited to have a greater impact on focal evaluation, what if 
integration is low but the co-branding is of a very long duration?  This is seen, for example, in 
retailing where luxury brands (e.g., Prada) have tightly aligned themselves over extended periods 
with high-end outlets (e.g., Neiman Marcus).  From the standpoint of brand evaluation, does an 
extra long partnership mitigate the need for higher co-branding integration?  What if a competing 
luxury brand (say, Coach) not previously offered through the high-end retailer, co-develops and 
retails a product through this chain?  How will the Coach brand be evaluated vis-à-vis Prada?  
Such interplay seems worthy of future research and would require empirical work.   
Empirical validation of our conceptual model would be a much needed next step.  Taking 
our model to data will help in a better appreciation of the various effect sizes.  For example, 
while we have proposed a hierarchy of co-branding types based on the degree of integration, it 
would help to quantify what the change in the outcome variables might be as the partners 
upgrade their relationship.  If co-located Barnes & Noble and Starbucks decide to co-promote, 
how would that impact evaluation and accessibility?  Instead of component branding with an 
already developed Intel microprocessor, what is the additional value to Apple and Intel of co-
developing a processor for a MacBook?  Further, on the empirical side, much of the research to 
date is based on controlled experiments.  Significant opportunities exist to develop or refine the 
measures of key constructs such as the level of co-branding integration, functional symmetry, 
hedonic symmetry, and brand breadth, along with the outcome measures of brand evaluation and 
accessibility.   
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We have posited the likely impact of hedonic symmetry and functional symmetry, but we 
did not explore whether or how hedonic and functional attributes interact.  The work of Gill 
(2008) in the context of convergent products suggests an interaction between the hedonic and the 
functional (or utilitarian) elements of the product.  In terms of co-branding, it would be 
worthwhile to examine which specific hedonic and functional attributes of the focal brand and its 
partner interact with each other and why. 
Our framework and propositions are based entirely on demand- (i.e., customer-) side 
drivers and rationales.  Supply-side and competitive factors are also important in co-branding 
decisions, but have been underexplored in the literature (except in a mergers and acquisitions 
context).  Research in transaction cost economics and industrial organization would suggest that 
capacity considerations, bargaining power of the prospective partners, entry deterrence, and 
opportunistic behavior in resource commitment under co-development can all influence the 
formation and evolution of co-branding arrangements.  Consider entry deterrence.  It would 
appear that Apple’s decision to offer the iPhone exclusively to AT&T (until recently) 
significantly influenced market structure and response.  The eventual surge in smartphone 
innovation involving Dell, Google, Motorola and Samsung, among others, is in no small measure 
due to the desperation and participation of Verizon and Sprint in the race against AT&T and 
Apple.  So was Apple right to have gone exclusive with AT&T in the first place?  The 
interaction among demand-, supply- and competitor-side factors has the potential to spawn 
multiple studies. 
It would also be insightful to examine which types of organizational cultures and 
resources are more conducive to stronger co-branding relationships.  The work on mergers and 
acquisitions (e.g., Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava 2008) and strategic alliances (e.g., Gerwin 
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2004) is relevant in this case.  Appling our framework to brand acquisitions may also shed light 
on a complex topic (Wiles, Morgan and Rego 2011; Mizik, Knowles and Dinner 2011).   
Our examples mostly pertain to U.S. brands.  The increasing importance of overseas 
markets and the global supply chain demands an international and cross-cultural flavor to co-
branding.  Factors such as country of origin (Gürhan-Canli and Maheswaran 2000) and 
standardization versus customization (Zou and Cavusgil 2002) might require an adaptation of our 
managerial guidelines.  We urge future work based on such international considerations. 
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4.0  ESSAY 3:  CO-BRANDING INTEGRATION AND THE IMPACT ON BRAND 
RECALL AND EVALUATION 
4. 1        INTRODUCTION 
Previous work in co-branding has focused on particular types (or a subset of types) of co-
branding such as Park, Jun and Shocker’s work on composite brand extensions (1996), or Desai 
and Keller’s work on ingredient branding (2002).  However, Newmeyer, Venkatesh, and 
Chatterjee (NVC from here forward) propose a typology of co-branding based on the degree of 
integration between the partnering brands (2011).  The degree of co-branding integration 
captures the extent to which the brands are intertwined in form and function.  While co-branding 
is the joint presentation of two or more brands with a strategic or tactical intent, the extent of 
integration can span the spectrum from (almost) completely self-standing to completely fused 
together.  Starbucks Coffee co-located in Barnes & Noble stores exemplifies one end of the 
spectrum, with the two brands completely separated in form and function.  At the other end, 
Sony Ericsson equipment, mostly cell phones co-developed by a Sony—Ericsson joint venture, 
represents two brands that are fully integrated in development, form and function.   
The hierarchy proposed by NVC shows six types of co-branding, which defines each type 
in terms of the presence or absence of certain characteristics: co-creation of the co-branded 
offering, physical or functional separability, tie-in sales, discount for purchasing the partnering 
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brand, and greater variety and/or reduced search (NVC 2011). Refer to Table 6 on page 53 for 
the complete hierarchy.  
From the perspective of the focal brand, or one brand of the pairing, NVC then propose a 
set of propositions which outline the impact on brand accessibility and evaluation based on the 
level of integration between partners.   In general, as the level of integration increases, it is 
expected that the impact on both accessibility and evaluation will increase as well.  The goal of 
this work is to expand on the theoretical foundation laid by NVC by testing several of the 
propositions through experimentation.  First, using the associative memory model (see Anderson 
1983) as our guide, we will test to see if the level of recall of the focal brand increases as the 
level of integration increases.  Next, a negative scenario will be presented to subject to determine 
if one’s evaluation of the focal brand will vary depending on the given level of integration.  This 
hypothesis will be based on the use of attribution theory.   
Measuring consumers’ recall, consideration, choice, and evaluation of the focal brand is 
important to managers who are considering forming a co-branding arrangement.  Knowing how 
consumers will react to each particular type of co-branding arrangement is a vital component 
when determining how and with whom to co-brand.  In the following section the conceptual 
ideas and hypotheses will be developed.  Next, our studies will be presented, and finally steps for 
moving forward will conclude the paper.   
4.2    CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Previous literature has showed us that consumers prefer co-branded products to single brand 
extensions (Desai and Keller 2002), yet we do not know how consumers respond to different 
types of co-branding arrangements.  Because co-branding has become such a pervasive 
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marketing strategy, it is crucial for academic research to more clearly define the anticipated 
outcome of using different co-branding arrangements.  This is important for two reasons:  one, a 
firm must understand how the co-brand arrangement will affect the parent brand’s accessibility 
in memory as this can directly impact recall, consideration, and choice (Nedangadi 1990); two, 
understanding which brand of the partnership will receive the blame or credit for the outcome of 
the partnership can directly affect the evaluation of the parent brand.  From this perspective, the 
work in this paper will focus on a “focal brand,” or one brand in the pairing, as the results will 
then be able to translate into direct managerial guidelines.  From this point forward, the “focal” 
brand refers to the brand in the experimental arrangements which will be the basis for the 
measurements of the effects of the independent variables.  The second brand in the partnership 
will be referred to as the partner brand. 
Focal Brand Recall 
  Before a memory-based choice can be made, consumers must be aware of and able to 
recall particular brands and products (e.g., Lavidge and Steiner 1961).  One factor affecting a 
consumer’s ability to recall a particular brand is the strength of the connection between the given 
brand and other information in memory.  The ease with which a brand enters a consideration set 
depends on the ways in which it is linked with other objects or concepts (Alba, Hutchinson, and 
Lynch 1991; John et. al. 2006).   For example, thinking about lunch could cue various 
restaurants, just as the thought of any of these restaurants might bring to mind the idea of lunch.  
Extending this to co-branding, the thought of one brand, such as Coke, may bring to mind other 
soft drink brands such as Sprite and Pepsi, but also co-brand partners such as NutraSweet or 
Splenda as these brands are all associated together with the brand Coke in memory (Alba, 
Hutchinson and Lynch 1991; Tulving and Thompson 1973; van Osselaer and Alba 2003).   
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Related work on memory retrieval (e.g., Morrin 1999, p. 518) points to a co-activation of 
connected nodes, such that in a co-brand context the retrieval of one brand in the partnership 
(i.e., Ford) may be cued when the partner is recalled (i.e. Eddie Bauer). 
The brand is recalled by a process of retrieval from memory (Alba, Hutchinson, and 
Lynch 1991) and/or external cues (Lehmann and Pan 1994) like viewing the partner of a co-
brand arrangement.   Accessibility increases as the linkages in memory for a brand increase in 
number and in the strength of the association between objects or brands (e.g., Hutchinson 1983), 
which in turn should increase the rate of recall (Ozanne, Brucks, and Grewal 1992; Kumar 
2005).  The association could arise through concomitant usage (Desai and Hoyer 2000), fit in 
salient attributes (Park, Jun, and Shocker 1996), and repeated exposure (Lane 2000), or as NVC 
propose the level of co-brand integration.   Co-branding of any type increases the number of 
links in memory as the focal brand is linked to another; additionally, as the degree of integration 
increases the partners are more tightly fused in form and function so the links created in memory 
by a higher level of integration should be stronger because there will be more concomitant usage 
and salient attributes of the partnership (Desai and Hoyer 2000; Park, Jun and Shocker 1996).   
For example, in a highly integrated context consumers willing to consider one brand (e.g., 
Breyer’s) would be more likely to recall and choose its highly integrated partner as well (e.g., 
Reese’s).  Lower integration works in a more benign manner to bring about accessibility and 
consideration through exposure and association of the partner (e.g., Taco Bell and Pizza Hut): 
customers seeking one brand alone are not forced to choose or even recall the other since each is 
a separate entity. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: As the degree of co-branding integration increases, the greater the likelihood 
of recall of the focal brand.  
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To this point, this research has been focused on how the differing levels of integration 
will affect recall, consideration, and choice.  We will next take this one step further to explore 
how the level of integration will affect brand evaluation.  While work on memory has explored 
prior brand evaluations (e.g., Lynch et.al. 1988), no research has yet explored how different 
levels of co-brand integration effect changes in brand evaluation.  For this, we turn to attribution 
theory.  
Brand Evaluation 
Brand evaluation represents the opinion or assessment of the value of a brand (Brunner 
and Wanke 2006; Gürhan-Canli 2003; Labroo and Lee 2006) by a consumer, possibly built on 
attribute level impressions (e.g., nice taste vs. high calorie content, as in the case of Godiva 
chocolate; Park et al. 1996).  In a co-branding context, focal brand evaluation can be impacted 
when the characteristics of the partnering brand are seen to fuse with, influence, or rub onto the 
characteristics of the focal brand (Ahluwalia and Gurhan-Canli, 2000; Simonin and Ruth 1998).  
Attribution, a process of causal reasoning, is an apt lens to examine the impact on focal brand 
evaluation in a co-branding situation.   
A foundation of attribution theory analyzes how individuals determine the cause of a 
particular outcome; specifically how individuals determine the locus of performance, or who or 
what made the outcome occur (Weiner 1986).  NVC propose that the degree of co-branding 
integration has a bearing on how consumers may determine the locus of performance, and in turn 
attribute strong or weak performance of the co-branded offering.  In the co-branding context, 
consumers may identify as the source of good or bad performance the focal brand alone, the 
partnering brand alone, both brands jointly, or neither (but some extraneous factor instead).  
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Attribution, being a process of cause identification and inference, is an appropriate mechanism to 
explore the impact of co-brand integration on focal brand evaluation.  
A higher degree of co-branding integration means the partnering brands are physically 
and functionally more inseparable.  Thus, it is harder to attribute the source of good (or bad) 
performance to just one brand.  The difficulty in identifying the locus of performance when the 
brands are more highly integrated implies that both are likely to share the responsibility in the 
event of good (or poor) performance when the locus is internal to the product (Teas and McElroy 
1986).  Conversely, in the case of lower integration such as with co-location in the Barnes & 
Noble – Starbucks example, the locus of a poorly brewed cup of coffee is clearly with Starbucks, 
and the responsibility, if any, assigned to Barnes & Noble is likely to be minimal.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 2:  For a positive (negative) event, as the degree of co-branding integration 
increases, evaluation of the focal brand will increase (decrease). 
 
4.3   STUDY 1 
Experimental Design.   Following a pattern similar to that of Nedungadi (1990), Study 1 attempts 
to measure recall, consideration and choice for the focal brand in the co-brand pairing.   Using a 
mixed design, the experiment varied a sub-set of integration types (i.e. ingredient branding, 
bundling, and co-promotion) over multiple categories (i.e. food, cell phone components, and 
computers).  This method allowed the rates of choice, consideration, and recall can be compared 
both within and between subjects (Nedungadi 1990).   It is expected that the subjects given the 
brand pairing which exhibited a higher level of integration would recall, consider and choose the 
focal brand more often than the same pairing at a lower level of integration.   
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Only a sub-set of integration types were used in the experiment for multiple reasons.  
Logistically, using all six types would have required a much larger sample size, and realistically, 
creating believable pairings with the same brands across all six types would be close to 
impossible.  Due to the variance across form and function, yet the ease of creating realistic 
pairings, ingredient branding, bundling, and co-promotion have been chosen for the stimuli.   
The subjects included 138 undergraduate students from a public university in the 
Northeast.  Each subject was presented with a description of a new product.  The order 
presentation of the product descriptions of the co-brands (ingredient, bundle, or co-promotion) 
were randomly assigned to each subject through the online survey tool.  The product was a co-
brand that consisted of one fictitious (the focal brand) and one real brand name.   It is the hope 
that by using a fictitious name for the focal brand any confounds associated with using real brand 
names such as prior evaluation and familiarity will be eliminated. Similarly to the experiments 
run by Nedungadi (1990), the stimulus was presented to the subjects three times for different 
product combinations and each time the given co-brand randomly varied in integration. The 
variables of interested were measured after each product description.  The product combinations 
which are outlined in Table 7 included ice cream and chocolate bars, cell phones and MP3 
players, and backpacks and water bottles.   For an example of the stimulus please see Appendix 
B.   
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TABLE 7: Product Combinations 
 Ingredient Bundle Co-Promotion 
Partner Brand Focal Brand    
Ben and Jerry’s 
ice cream 
CocoaLoco 
chocolate 
A new flavor of Ben 
and Jerry’s ice cream 
containing CocoaLoco 
chocolate pieces 
Ben and Jerry’s ice 
cream sold with a 
bar of CocoaLoco 
chocolate 
Ben and Jerry’s ice 
cream sold with a 
coupon for a bar of 
CocoaLoco 
chocolate 
LG Cell phone Tunes2Go MP3 player 
A new LG phone 
containing a 
Tunes2Go MP3 player 
A new LG phone 
sold as a bundle 
with a Tunes2Go 
MP3 Player 
A new LG phone 
sold with an in-
store instant rebate 
for a Tunes2Go 
MP3 player 
North Face 
Backpack 
HydroPlus 
water bottle 
A new North Face 
pack containing a 
HydroPlus bottle 
A new North Face 
pack sold as a 
bundle with a 
HydroPlus bottle 
A new North Face 
pack sold with an 
in-store instant 
rebate for a 
HydroPlus bottle 
 
To measure the outcome variables, subjects were first asked to list what brand they would 
choose in the product category of the focal brand (i.e., MP3 players), they then listed other 
brands they considered selecting in that category, and finally, they were asked to list all of the 
brands within that category that come to mind.   The results were then coded as 1 when the brand 
was chosen, considered or recalled and 0 if it was not.  Using a 7 point Likert scale several 
additional variables were also measured including familiarity with the product category, opinion 
of both brands and opinion of the brand combination.  The scales were anchored by “very 
familiar, not at all familiar” and “has many positive attributes, has few positive attributes” 
respectively.  Several demographic variables were also measured.   
Results.  Unfortunately, the results of the experiment are inconclusive.  Conducting a 
within subjects design was impossible as no subject chose or considered the focal brand for any 
of the 3 categories.  Because subjects did not choose or consider the focal brand only recall was 
able to be analyzed between subjects.  A simple ANOVA analysis was conducted to compare the 
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number of times the focal brand was recalled in each of the co-branding categories.  When 
analyzing the data using a between subjects design, significant results did not exist for either 
CocoaLoco or HydroPlus in the ice cream/candy bar and backpack/water bottle co-brands 
respectively.  However, close to significant results are present for recall of the Tunes2Go brand 
in the cell phone/MP3 product category.  The ANOVA analysis shows that the recall rates do 
vary by integration level (F2, 130 = 2.16, p =.11, partial η2 = .031), but they do not vary as 
predicted.  Unexpectedly, the bundled co-brand is recalled significantly more often than the 
ingredient co-brand (Mb = .25, Mi = .09; p < .05).  The difference between the recall rates of the 
ingredient and co-promotion and bundle and co-promotion products is not significant.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 6:  Recall Rates for Differing levels of Co-Brand Integration 
 
1 = ingredient, 2 = bundle, 3 = co-promotion 
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Further exploratory analysis was conducted using general linear models.  Instead of using 
recall as the dependent variable, it was included as an independent variable and the subjects’ 
opinion of the focal brand was used as the dependent variable.  The opinion of the focal brand 
was measured using a 7 point Likert scale after the subject was asked to recall brands in the focal 
brand product category.  Similar to the results of the ANOVA, a simple model using the opinion 
of the focal brand as the dependent variable was found to be close to significant (F5, 130 = 1.83, 
p = .11 and R2 = .066).  Interestingly, there is a marginally significant interaction between the 
level of integration and recall of the focal brand on the opinion of the focal brand (β = 10.98, p < 
.10, partial η2 = .04).  When the focal brand is recalled in the bundled context the opinion of it is 
rated very low; however, when the focal brand is not recalled in the bundled context, it is rated 
much higher (Mr = 2.18, Mn = 3.55, p < .01).  In contrast, the opinion of the focal brand is not 
dependent upon recall in either the ingredient (Mr = 3.25, Mn = 3.2, n.s.) or the co-promotion (Mr 
= 3.13, Mn = 2.87, n.s.) situation.    When the bundled co-brand is not recalled the mean of 
opinion of the focal brand is also significantly higher than that of co-promotion (Mnb = 3.55, Mnp 
= 2.87, p < .05), but not the ingredient pairing (Mnb = 3.55, Mni = 3.21, n.s.).    Due to the small 
number of subjects that recalled the focal brand the difference between the opinion of the 
bundled product is not significantly different than either the ingredient (Mrb = 2.18, Mri = 3.25, 
n.s.) or co-promotion (Mrb = 2.18, Mrp = 3.13, n.s.) situation.  These results are highlighted in 
Figure 2.     
 
 100 
 
FIGURE 7:  The Opinion of the Focal Brand based on the Level of Integration and 
if It Is Recalled or Not 
 
Discussion.  While the lack of significant results is disappointing, it is somewhat 
reassuring to find some significant effects for the degree of integration and the level of recall.  
Several explanations for the lack of results will be explored in the future directions section.  
The results of this exploratory analysis do lend credence to the use of attribution theory 
as a mechanism for explaining how co-brands effect brand evaluation.  It appears that brand 
evaluation is changing based on the level of integration due to the significant interaction effect 
with integration and opinion of the brand.  This idea will be explored further in Study 2.   
 
4.4   STUDY 2 
 
Experimental Design.  Study 2 was designed to measure the evaluation of the focal brand.  
Subjects were given a description of two brands (CakeMix and CandyBar), the joint product 
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which the two brands formed, and a description of the negative outcome of the partnership (See 
Appendix A for an example). Fictional brand names were used to prevent bias due to existing 
opinions of real brands.  Similarly to study 1, the level of integration was randomly varied by 
subject and included ingredient, bundles, and co-promotion arrangements.  Because a between 
subjects design was used, each subject received a product description containing only one of the 
possible three levels of co-brand arrangements.   
  The dependent variable (evaluation of the focal brand) was measured by asking each 
subject to rate their evaluation of the focal brand (CandyBar) after reading about the poor 
performance of the co-brand.  The evaluation of the brand was measured using a 7 point Likert 
scale anchored with “I have a negative/positive view of this brand.”  It is expected that the 
subjects given the co-brand with a higher level of integration (ingredient versus bundling or co-
promotion) would evaluate the focal brand worse than the brand pairs with a lower level of 
integration, as it is harder to attribute performance to one brand alone as they are tightly joined in 
form and function.  Along with evaluation, attribution variables such as percentage of 
responsibility, consistency, control, and duration were also measured for each of the brands 
separately.  The percentage of responsibility was measured by asking students how responsible 
CandyBar is for the product performance.  The values were restricted to be between 0 and 100.  
A 7 point Likert scale was used to measure the additional variables.  The subjects included 168 
undergraduate students from a large public university in the Northeast.   
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TABLE 8: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Candy % 
responsibility 
168 0 85 36.42 15.397 
duration 168 1 7 4.45 1.459 
consistency 168 1 7 3.86 1.305 
control 168 1 7 4.02 1.356 
evaluation 168 1 7 4.46 1.049 
Valid N (listwise) 168     
 
Results.  Using general linear models and focal brand evaluation as the dependent 
variable the model is significant (F = 3.91, p < .01 and R2 = .108); however, focal brand 
evaluation did not vary over the level of integration (β = .296, n.s.).  Attribution variables such as 
responsibility (β = 9.87, p < .01, partial η2 = .046) and consistency (β = 4.05, p < .05, partial η2 = 
.02) do explain significant variance for focal brand evaluation lending support for the use of 
attribution theory as a mechanism to explain evaluation of the individual brands in a co-brand 
arrangement.  See Table 3 for descriptive statistics of the included variables.  
Exploring the relationship between attribution and co-brand integration further, additional 
GLM analysis was conducted using the percentage of responsibility placed on the focal brand as 
the dependent variable.  Consistent with attribution theory, consistency, duration, and control 
were used to predict responsibility for the outcome (Teas and McElroy 1986).  Additionally the 
level of integration was also added to the model.  Overall the model was significant (F = 14.38, p 
< .001 and R2 = .386).  A significant main effect was found for the accountability (β = 50.16, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .228) and the effect of consistency (β = 6.99, p < .05, partial η2 = .04).  As 
subjects rated CandyBar for having more control of the situation and the situation occurring 
repeatedly the amount of responsibility for the outcome of the co-brand arrangement placed on 
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CandyBar increased.  The effect of duration on the amount of responsibility placed on CandyBar 
was not significant (β = -.84, n.s.).   
Using the co-promotion as the reference category, there was also a significant main effect 
for the ingredient category.  Unfortunately it is in the wrong direction (β = -5.66, p = .05, partial 
η2 = .02).  The negative value shows that the percentage of responsibility placed on the focal 
brand actually decreases in an ingredient situation compared to a co-promotion situation.  This is 
counter to the arguments of NVC which states the level of responsibility or blame should 
increase with the level of integration.  The focal brand of bundled co-brands appears to have 
more responsibility placed on it compared to co-promotions which is the prediction; however, no 
significant difference was found (β = 2. 10, n.s.).   
Discussion. The results of Study 2 suggest that the use of attribution theory as a 
mechanism for explaining changes with brand evaluation is correct.  While the results for the 
relationship between brand evaluation and integration are inconclusive, the significant results of 
the elements of attribution signal that more work is needed in this area.  Because responsibility 
was such a strong predictor of brand evaluation, and the level of integration helped predict 
responsibility, it may be possible that a system of equations is needed to explain the relationship 
between evaluation and integration.  Additional directions for this research are described below.   
 
4.5     FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Experimental Design Changes 
For study 1, one possible explanation for the bundled product to be recalled more is that 
two physical products are much easier to interpret than an ingredient or a coupon.  The bundled 
product is much more tangible than the other two cases and subjects may have an easier time 
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envisioning the bundled and co-promotion co-brand arrangement than the ingredient co-brand.  
The bundle product also acts as a 2-for-1 situation which may be more appealing than the 
ingredient product or in-store rebate.  Additionally, the ingredient co-brand is one product while 
the bundle and the co-promotion are still separate products.  When just looking at the recall rates 
of the bundled product and the co-promotion the results are in the correct direction with the 
bundled arrangement being recalled more than the co-promotion.   One possible solution to this 
problem would be to have physical examples of the different types of co-brands instead of just 
written descriptions presented online.  This may make the degree of integration in the various co-
branding situations more palpable.   Changing the stimuli for Study 2 may also help increase the 
strength of the results for the level of integration.   
Another possibility for increasing the strength of the results for both Study 1 and 2 would 
be to actually manipulate the strength of dependence for one brand on another.  This would act as 
a proxy for the degree of integration.  As the dependence of one brand increased it would be 
similar to the degree of integration increasing.  This may be easier for the subject to understand 
than just reading a description about an ingredient, bundle or co-promotion.   
Moving forward it will also be necessary to increase the complexity of the studies.  For 
example, Study 2 was constructed with only a negative outcome.  To get a more complete view 
of the effects of integration on brand evaluation both a positive and negative outcome should be 
used.  It may be possible that the effect of integration on evaluation will vary in strength or 
direction for various outcomes.   
Moderating Effects  
It is possible that additional variables may play a role in the recall and evaluation of the 
focal brand.  On such variable is fit.  The notion of fit is important in brand literature (e.g., Loken 
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et al. 2007), yet not always clearly defined.   For example, Park, Jun, and Shocker (1996) suggest 
that Slimfast cake mix by Godiva can be a good fit because it connotes complementarity: the low 
calorie character of Slimfast is seen to be aided by Godiva’s rich taste.  Others discuss fit as the 
similarity between the brands (e.g. Park, Milberg and Lawson 1991).   Additional studies could 
be used to disentangle this confusion by looking at both hedonic similarity and functional 
complementarity separately.    
The direct impact of the nature of the co-branding arrangement (the fundamental 
structural decisions to be made by the focal brand about the partnership) may be moderated by 
the characteristics and identities of the partnering brands individually and relative to each other 
(NVC).  More specifically, consider the moderating effects of hedonic similarity and functional 
complementarity between partners. High level hedonic attributes, such as luxury (as in Gucci) or 
glamour (as in Revlon), capture the sensory or emotional images evoked by the brand (Aaker 
1997; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982).  In a co-branding situation, partnering brands could be 
similar or dissimilar on such high level hedonic elements.  Functional (or utilitarian) attributes, 
such as printing speed or the ability to fight cavities, relate to how a product or component 
performs or how convenient or practical it is to use (Chitturi, Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008; 
Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000).   The partner brand could be similar to the focal brand on the 
functional attributes or complementary – by being strong on attributes on which its partner is 
weak.  The focus on these factors is motivated by their importance as noted in the co-branding 
and brand extension literature (e.g. Helmig, Huber, and Leeflang 2008; Lei, Dawar, and 
Lemmink 2008; Meyvis and Janiszewski 2004; Park, Milberg and Lawson 1991; Ruth 2001).  
An additional moderating variable may be the position of the individual brand names in 
the co-brand.   Park, Jun and Shocker (1996) show that depending on how a composite brand 
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extension (ingredient co-brand) is labeled, the evaluation of the individual brands may change.  
The name which is positioned as the main brand is the header and the “ingredient” would be the 
modifier.  In the case of study 2, CakeMix was used as the header or main brand and CandyBar 
was used as the modifier in the ingredient co-brand example.  In the case of bundling and co-
promotion the header/modifier roles do not exist.  The results of the evaluation of CandyBar may 
change for the ingredient brand if the roles were reversed.   
By adjusting the stimuli and adding moderating variables it is our hope that this research 
will provide more conclusive results on how the level of co-brand integration affects recall and 
evaluation.   
  
4.6     CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, by building on the previous work by NVC, we had hoped to show through 
experimentation that subjects’ level of recall and evaluation vary with the given level of co-brand 
integration.  While the results were not as conclusive as expected some evidence was found to 
support the hypotheses that the level of integration of a co-brand arrangement affects recall and 
evaluation of a brand.  Moving forward, changes to the stimuli and additional moderating 
variables should help clarify the effects.  Continuing this research is important because, 
determining the effects of the type of co-branding integration offers managers better insight 
when forming a co-branding partnership.   
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
Managerial Implications 
Because new product development is very expensive, both brand acquisitions and co-
branding has become a very popular mode of diversifying a product portfolio.  In past years co-
branding rates have grown by an estimate of 40% annually (Dickinson and Heath 2006) and 
merger and acquisition deals encompass trillions of dollars every year (Gupta and Gerchak 2002) 
making the research in this dissertation of great importance.  Partnering with an established 
brand in either the case of co-branding or brand acquisitions reduces the risk of developing a new 
product or brand and targeting new markets.   Determining the factors which create a successful 
partnership will save companies an exorbitant amount of money, brand equity, and human 
capital.  For example the acquisition of Snapple by Quaker Oats cost the company approximately 
$1.4 billion dollars as Snapple was purchased by Quaker Oats for $1.7 billion in 1994 and sold to 
Triarc for $300 million in 1997 (Burns 1997).   
Overall, the most important result for managers in all three essays of this dissertation is 
the information that will help in selecting the appropriate partner for the acquiring firm or focal 
brand.  In the case of co-branding the choice of partner will depend on the firm’s goals.  Is the 
firm looking to expand into new market segments or develop and/or change their brand image?  
To expand into new market segments a firm may choose a low level of integration with many 
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partners – perhaps a co-promotion with multiple retail chains.  To develop or change brand 
image, a firm may choose a higher level of integration with only one partner.  Before choosing 
how and with whom to co-brand a manager must have clear goals on what the co-brand is 
expected to accomplish.  
In the case of brand acquisitions it is also important to be clear on the goals of the 
transaction; the choice of partners is determined by factors independent of this decision.  The 
most important element of the decision to purchase a brand is to evaluate the capabilities of the 
firm’s brand management teams.  If the firm has a strong brand management team then the 
choice of target brands need not be as selective.  When a firm has a strong brand management 
capability this helps override the negative impact of poor fit, a corporate brand name strategy, or 
a low level of diversification.  Conversely, if the firm lacks a brand management capability then 
it would be wise to purchase a brand if and only if the acquiring firm has a house of brands 
strategy, the brand fits well with the existing product portfolio, and the acquiring firm has a high 
level of diversification.  As highlighted in Essay 1, the average difference between the positive 
returns of a successful acquisition versus the negative returns from a failure (from the 
perspective of the financial market) is over $3 billion.  Executives and managers must be aware 
of how brand acquisitions may impact their firm’s stock performance.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
While each individual essay provides ideas for future research these apply specifically to 
the topics discussed in each paper.  The broader research topic of brand partnerships contains 
many avenues to explore.  One limitation of this work is that the acquisitions used in Essay 1 and 
most of the examples in Essay 2 and 3 are based in the United States.  An interesting and 
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important direction for future exploration is the use of brand partnerships in an international 
context.  To compete in the global marketplace companies must do business internationally and 
in turn make difficult entry decisions.  Should they use direct investment, exportation, or a joint 
venture?  If the choice is a joint venture should the corporate brand names be presented and 
advertised to the customer in the form of a co-brand?   
First, using the ideas developed in Essay 1, a multinational firm may want to explore 
their level of diversification, brand name strategy and brand management capability, and fit with 
the partner firm before deciding to participate in a branded joint venture.  If a branded joint 
venture is executed then the co-branding guidelines explored in Essay 2 and Essay 3 will help 
determine the appropriate level of integration, exclusivity and duration for the partnership.  
Additional work must be done in the international arena to obtain a more complete guideline for 
forming brand partnerships.  
Exploring the impact of all three essays at an international level is important, but so is 
expanding the findings across business types as well.  The current research focuses mainly (but 
not solely) on business to consumer products.  Essay 2 does include some B-2-B examples; 
however, none exist in either Essay 1 or 3 due to the nature of the studies.  In Essay 1 expanding 
the idea of brand acquisitions would be valuable in a B-2-B context as brands are also important 
to businesses as well as consumers.  In both the B-2-C and B-2-B arenas acquisitions are used as 
a method of expansion.  Additional brand acquisitions also take a firm from a B-2-B focus and 
expand into a B-2-C market (or vice a versa) such as the purchase of Kinko’s by FedEx in 2004 
for $2.4 billion.  It is interesting and necessary to determine if the findings highlighted in Essay 1 
hold for brand acquisitions beyond those in the industries of health and beauty, pharmaceuticals, 
and food and beverage.   
 110 
Expanding Essay 3 to also include B-2-B examples would also make the impact of the 
paper richer.  While recall and evaluation have traditionally been explored in the business to 
consumer context the impact of such outcomes are also felt in the business to business realm.  As 
many of the quotes in Essay 2 highlight, co-branding is not restricted to consumer goods and the 
impact of such partnerships on recall and evaluation should be explored across all possible 
situations.  
An additional idea which was explored in all 3 essays is the notion of fit between brands, 
partners, or acquired firms.  In literature involving mergers and acquisitions the notion of fit 
usually describes the relatedness between product categories and possible synergies that may 
exist between the acquirer and target brands/firms ((Rumelt 1974; Salter and Weinhold 1979; 
Singh and Montgomery 1987; Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2008).  Differently, 
literature in consumer behavior, brand extensions, and co-branding tend to view fit as a match 
between brand images such a sophisticated (i.e. Coach) or rugged (i.e. Jeep) (Aaker 1997, 
Hirschman and Holbrook 1982).  Both streams of research have also looked at fit in terms of a 
match of complementary skills (e.g., Park, Jun and Shocker 1996, Swaminathan, Murshed, and 
Hulland).  It would behoove marketing and specifically branding research to more clearly define 
the construct of fit so it is consistent across all streams of research.   
It would also be interesting to explore how different brand images may fit together based 
on their position in the co-brand arrangement.  Currently Essay 2 and 3 treat both brands as 
equals in the arrangement.  Park, Jun and Shocker (1996) found that the impact on an individual 
brand’s feedback effects and attribute profile change depending on if it is the “header” or 
“modifying” brand.  Park and colleagues use the example of Slim-Fast cake mix by Godiva.  In 
this case Slim-Fast is the header brand and Godiva is the modifier.  I believe this work can be 
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extended by experimenting with different brand images in each position.  For example it may be 
possible to modify a sophisticated brand with an exciting brand; however, it may not be possible 
to modify an exciting brand with a sincere one.  Exploring this idea will further clarify the 
boundary conditions of forming a successful co-branding relationship.  
A third issue which was only explored in Essay 2 is the number of partners a firm should 
pursue in a co-branding arrangement.  Essay 2 explores the relationship between the number of 
partners in a co-branding situation and the effect on brand accessibility and brand evaluation.  To 
summarize the findings, a large number of partners will have a positive impact on accessibility 
and a single number of partners will have a greater impact on evaluation.  However, these 
findings are given as absolutes – one or many.  In the case of accessibility this result is straight 
forward such that as the number of partners increase, the links in memory increase as well; 
therefore accessibility will increase.  In the case of evaluation, using absolutes such as one or 
many may not provide all of the answers.   
In Essay 2, I postulate that having many partners will reduce the impact on brand 
evaluation, because something may go wrong with one pairing, but additional pairings may 
remain successful thus mitigating any negative evaluations from the single failure.  However, 
what if something goes wrong with multiple partners?  This may actually lead to a more negative 
evaluation than a poor outcome with in an exclusive co-branding arrangement.  The same 
question holds for a positive outcome as well.  An interesting topic for future research would be 
to explore the threshold of negative to positive outcomes which still lead to an overall positive 
evaluation.   
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An additional limitation of both Essay 2 and 3 is that the results focus on the anticipated 
outcome of a co-branding relationship from the perspective of the consumer.  It is also important 
to explore the outcome of the co-branding arrangement from the perspective of the financial 
market.  Just as Swaminathan and Moorman explore abnormal returns in the case of marketing 
alliance announcements (2009), it would be possible to evaluate how the market reacts to co-
branding announcements.  It is quite possible that the partner characteristics outlined in Essay 2 
and 3 not only will have an impact on consumer perceptions but market perceptions as well.  
Determining the financial impact (in terms of stock returns) is not only an important step in 
evaluating the success of a co-branding arrangement, but also validating the importance of 
marketing actions.   
Building upon this issue, exploring the long-term outcome of both brand acquisitions and 
co-branding is important.  Based on the efficient market hypothesis (Brown & Warner 1985; 
Carhart 1997; Fama and French 1993) event studies capture the long-term financial impact of the 
transaction for both brand acquisitions as described in Essay 1 or brand alliances as outlined by 
Swaminathan and Moorman (2009); yet, success can be measured by more than just stock 
returns.  It may be possible to measure long-term changes in marketing variables such as brand 
equity, sales, or market share to more fully understand the overall long-term success of both 
brand acquisitions and co-brand arrangements.  Showing success by more than one method will 
help support marketing actions as important business decisions.  
In conclusion, I hoped to have provided insights into the world of brand partnerships for 
both academics and practitioners alike.  Co-branding and brand acquisitions are both common 
ways for firms to expand and diversify their product portfolios.  In both situations, it is vital to 
the success of the partnership to ensure that the chosen brand will enhance the existing 
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characteristics of both the partner brand and the firm as a whole.  This work attempts to bring 
together topics from both consumer behavior and marketing strategy to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the world of brand partnerships.  All essays, but specifically essay 1, 
also build on marketing research which shows the impact of marketing actions.  In the case of 
brand acquisitions determining if the target brand will be successful for the acquiring firm will 
save billions of dollars.  Essay 2 and 3 build on this stream in a more abstract manner as they do 
not specifically outline cost savings, but lead to future research which may.  It is my hope to 
have shed light on what characteristics of the partnering brands and parent firms are needed for a 
successful partnership to ensure success in a brand partnership.  
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6.0  APPENDIX A 
Personal Interviews with Executives: Profiles of Participants 
Profile/Characteristics Number of Participants  
Exchange Type Business-to-business (primarily) 16 
 Business-to-consumer (primarily) 11 
Industry e-Commerce/information technology 8 
 Food 3 
 Consumer goods (fast moving consumer goods, nonfood) 
4 
 Technology 5 
 Consulting 2 
 Other 5 
Position Chief executive officer/managing director 2 
 President, vice president, or director 15 
 Manager, senior manager 9 
 Dean (emeritus) 1 
Function Marketing (including advertising) 14 
 Sales 5 
 Business consulting 1 
 Senior management 5 
 Corporate planning 2 
 Total 27 
 
Interview Process 
Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, but several were over the telephone.  Interviewees 
were assured that their identities and those of their firms would remain confidential.  The 
interviews were audiotaped, except in a few instances when the interviewees expressed 
reluctance, in which case we made extensive notes during the discussion.  Interviews lasted an 
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average of 45 minutes.  The interviews were mostly free flowing, but a list of guideline questions 
was also asked during the interviews.  We also asked follow-up questions in some cases.  We 
also asked participants their views on our conceptualizing themes and variables of interest. 
Interview Protocol (Guideline Questions) 
• Could you talk about co-branding examples that your firm has pursued or overseen?  Why 
did your firm pursue these relationships? 
• How do your customers view your co-branding efforts?  What do they stand to gain or lose? 
• In the above examples, how would you assess the actual outcomes vis-à-vis the intended 
outcomes?  What factors contributed to the success or failure of co-branding? 
• How do you see the different types of co-branding?  When and why would firms pursue these 
types of co-branding? 
• What characteristics do you look for in your co-branding partners?  Why?  What if a partner 
is not interested in you? 
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7.0  APPENDIX B 
Study 1:  Stimuli Example 
 
New Cell Phone 
 In the following section you will be asked to review a new cell phone model.  Please review the 
new product and brands in the below description carefully.     
 
Ingredient:  LG a maker of high quality electronic devices has decided to partner with a new 
brand of MP3 players called Tunes2Go®.  The new LG phone will highlight its music playing 
capabilities which include a Tunes2Go unit built directly into the phone as a single unit. LG 
phones, Tunes2Go MP3 players, and the single-unit LG Tunes2Go phone/MP3 player will be 
carried by most cellular service providers and sold by most electronics retailers in the United 
States.     
Bundle:  LG a maker of high quality electronic devices has decided to partner with a new brand 
of MP3 players called Tunes2Go®.  The new LG phone will highlight its music playing 
capabilities which include a Tunes2Go MP3 player sold as a bundle, where the two products – 
the Tunes2Go MP3 player and the LG phone – will be sold as one package.  LG phones, 
Tunes2Go MP3 players, and the bundled package of the LG phone and Tunes2Go MP3 player 
will be carried by most cellular service providers and sold by most electronics retailers in the 
United States.   
 
Co-promotion:  LG a maker of high quality electronic devices has decided to partner with a new 
brand of MP3 players called Tunes2Go®.  The new LG phone will highlight its music playing 
capabilities and an in-store instant rebate will allow consumers to also receive a Tunes2Go 
player with the purchase of the LG phone.  LG phones, Tunes2Go MP3 players, and the LG 
phone with the instant in-store rebate for Tunes2Go MP3 player will be carried by most cellular 
service providers and sold by most electronics retailers in the United States.  
 
 
Study 2: Stimuli Example 
 
The following product information is from two well-known brands that have been in business for 
many years.   To eliminate potential consumer bias, the brands will be called CakeMix and 
CandyBar during this study.   
 
CakeMix is a popular brand of dessert mixes such as cakes and cookies.  The CakeMix brand 
also appears on other items such as icing and ready to bake items.   
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CandyBar is a popular brand of chocolate bars that comes in a variety of flavors such as milk 
chocolate and chocolate with almonds.  The CandyBar brand also appears on additional products 
such as hot chocolate and cocoa powder.   
 
Historically, the CandyBar and CakeMix brands have been rated positively by both consumers 
and third-party agencies such as Consumer Reports on taste, product quality, and value.   
 
Ingredient:  CakeMix and CandyBar recently teamed up to produce a co-brand, which is a joint 
venture that includes both the CakeMix and CandyBar brand names.  In this case a brownie 
flavor was created which included CakeMix’s chocolate brownie mix and CandyBar’s original 
milk chocolate bar pieces as ingredients in the mix.  The packaging stated that the brownie mix 
contained CakeMix and CandyBar ingredients.  
Bundle: CakeMix and CandyBar recently teamed up to produce a co-brand, which is a joint 
venture that includes both the CakeMix and CandyBar brand names. In this case a bundled 
product was created where a box of CakeMix brownie mix was packaged and sold together with 
a CandyBar chocolate bar.  The CandyBar bar was attached to the outside of the CakeMix box.  
Co-Promotion:  CakeMix and CandyBar recently teamed up to produce a co-brand, which is a 
joint venture that includes both the CakeMix and CandyBar brand names. In this case the 
companies produced a joint advertisement for both CakeMix’s chocolate brownie mix and 
CandyBar’s original milk chocolate bar.  The print ad showed a box of CakeMix and a 
CandyBar chocolate bar side by side.  
 
 Unfortunately, the co-brand produced by CandyBar and CakeMix did not increase sales as 
expected and will be discontinued.  While the companies refuse to state why the product failed, a 
recent survey conducted by a leading food magazine showed consumers’ perceptions of the co-
brand were only mediocre, because of reasons related to the “unoriginal” or “boring” flavor of 
the brownies. 
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